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Abstract
Making sure that a large software system is secure, is a very difficult task. The
experience with desktop and server computers teaches us that the insecurity of a
system is often proportional to a number of things, including the size of the attack
surface (i.e. how easy it is for an attacker to ‘talk’ to the computer) and how much
freedom the user gets to install and execute applications.
Mobile phones are progressing at a rapid and steady pace, making them evermore
attractive to attackers. A decade ago, a mobile phone was an electronic brick that
was barely capable of supporting telephony functions like calling and messaging
contacts. Fast forward to 2010, and they are completely transformed to full-fledged
multimedia devices with millions of colors and often touch functionality. Although
this evolution is exciting, it also uncovers a number of flaws in the original operating
systems and security mechanisms that have not changed much in the last decade.
The main goal of this dissertation is to improve upon the state of the art, in terms
of technical security mechanism and measures against attacks on or attacks by
software applications running on the mobile phone. There are two different ways to
approach this goal. New techniques can be implemented to fix the software that is
already out there. The advantage here is that it takes no or only a small effort to
update the huge amount of existing applications, but this approach can typically
only take you so far. The other option is to rethink everything from scratch. By
not having to be backwards compatible, better solutions can be designed and
implemented. The disadvantage is that it takes years for the bulk of the software
to switch to this new and improved system. However, before suggesting solutions
for security problems, we must first show that security is an important topic for
mobile phones.
This dissertation presents three main contributions.
1. Alphanumeric and Turing Complete Shellcode We prove that in code
injection attacks where the attacker is severely limited in the type of data he
can use to inject his payload, arbitrary code execution can still be achieved.
Hence, intrusion detection systems that are based on the detection of special
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patterns could possibly be bypassed by attackers, without limiting the attacker
in any way. We show that for the ARM architecture, the subset of instructions
that consist of only alphanumeric bytes is Turing Complete. Thus, if an
attacker can only use such alphanumeric instructions, he is not limited at all
in terms of computational capabilities.
2. A Countermeasure against Code Injection Attacks We introduce a
new countermeasure to protect applications against code injection attacks. A
modified compiler will emit extra security checks during the compilation of a
C application. These checks use a masking mechanism to assert that code
pointers cannot point to memory areas they should not point to. Even if an
attacker can somehow inject shellcode into the memory of an application, the
masking process will prevent the attacker from jumping to this injected code.
3. An Implementation and Evaluation of Security-by-Contract We
have implemented and evaluated a full and efficient implementation of the
new Security-by-Contract (SxC) paradigm on the .NET Full and Compact
Frameworks. The SxC framework is a deployment framework for managed
applications. It tries to statically guarantee that an application will never
violate a predetermined system policy, which is designed to protect system
resources from abuse. If the framework cannot statically guarantee the
compliance of the application with the policy, additional security checks are
embedded into the application that enforce compliance.
As the evaluation shows, our tools and frameworks are highly performant and
very compatible with existing code. The code injection countermeasure has a
performance overhead of only a few percentage points, and a memory overhead of
practically 0%. It is also very compatible with existing code bases, as was shown
by the SPEC benchmark. The SxC implementation shares the same characteristics.
If an application that is being deployed can somehow prove that it will never
break the system policy, the SxC framework will not impose any overhead at all.
However, for other applications, a runtime monitor is embedded in the application.
The performance of this monitor depends almost entirely on the complexity of the
policy that is being enforced. Our SxC implementation is very compatible with
existing code; not a single application has been reported to not work with the
prototype.
Abstract (Dutch)
Het beveiligen van een groot softwaresysteem is een bijzonder moeilijke opdracht.
Uit de ervaring met desktop- en servercomputers weten we dat de onveiligheid van
een systeem meestal proportioneel is met een aantal dingen, waaronder de grootte
van het aanvalsoppervlak (d.w.z. hoe makkelijk het is voor een aanvaller om te
‘spreken’ met de computer) en hoeveel vrijheid de gebruiker krijgt om applicaties
te installeren en uit te voeren.
Mobiele telefoons maken momenteel een bijzonder snelle evolutie mee, waardoor
ze vaker als doelwit gezien worden voor aanvallers. In een tijdspanne van slechts
enkele jaren zijn mobiele telefoons gee¨volueerd van een elektronische baksteen
die enkel gebruikt kon worden om te bellen en om berichtjes te sturen, tot een
hoogtechnologisch multimediatoestel, waarmee gebruikers kunnen surfen op het
internet, films en muziek afspelen, foto’s nemen, navigeren door het verkeer, en
applicaties installeren. Alhoewel dit een bijzonder interessante evolutie is, brengt
ze ook een aantal praktische problemen met zich mee. Omwille van de vele extra
functies wordt het ook makkelijker voor aanvallers om een beveiligingslek te vinden
dat kan misbruikt worden. Daarnaast zijn de verschillende beveiligingsmaatregelen
vaak niet meegee¨volueerd.
Het hoofdopzet van deze thesis is om de huidige stand van de techniek te verbeteren
op vlak van beveiligingsmechanismen tegen aanvallen op mobiele toestellen. Dit
kan bereikt worden op twee verschillende manieren. Bestaande software kan
beveiligd worden door het incorporeren van nieuwe beveiligingstechnieken. Dit
heeft als voordeel dat het slechts een kleine moeite vergt om bestaande software te
updaten, maar deze aanpak heeft ook zijn beperkingen. Een andere optie is om
de software volledige te herschrijven. Dit kan leiden tot veiligere programmacode,
maar vereist wel veel meer werk. Echter, vooraleer oplossingen voor diverse
beveiligingsproblemen aangedragen worden, moet eerst aangetoond worden dat
mobiele toestellen wel degelijk kwetsbaar zijn.
Deze thesis beschrijft drie contributies.
v
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1. Alfanumerieke en Turingvolledige Shellcode. We tonen aan dat een
aanvaller die een code-injectie-aanval uitvoert, waarbij hij zeer gelimiteerd is
in het type van data dat hij kan gebruiken, nog altijd arbitraire code kan
uitvoeren. Beveiligingssystemen die speciale gevaarlijke patronen proberen te
detecteren kunnen op deze manier omzeild worden, zonder de mogelijkheden
van de aanvaller te beperken. We tonen aan dat voor de ARM-architectuur de
subset van instructies die bestaan uit alfanumerieke karakters Turingvolledig
is. Een aanvaller die enkel gebruik kan maken van dergelijke alfanumerieke
instructies is dus niet gelimiteerd in computationele mogelijkheden.
2. Een Tegenmaatregel voor Code-injectie-aanvallen. We stellen een
nieuwe tegenmaatregel voor die beschermt tegen code-injectie-aanvallen.
Een aangepaste compiler zal extra veiligheidscontroles genereren tijden de
compilatie van een C-applicatie. Deze controles maken gebruik van een
maskeermechanisme dat verzekert dat codewijzers niet naar geheugenadressen
kunnen verwijzen waar ze niet naar zouden mogen verwijzen. Indien een
aanvaller erin slaagt om nieuwe programmacode in het geheugen van een
applicatie te injecteren, zal het maskeermechanisme voorkomen dat de
aanvaller de geinjecteerde code kan uitvoeren.
3. Een Implementatie en Evaluatie van Security-by-Contract. We
hebben een implementatie gemaakt en gee¨valueerd van het nieuwe Security-by-
Contract (SxC) paradigma op het volledige en het compacte .NET Framework.
Het SxC-raamwerk probeert statisch te garanderen dat een applicatie nooit
misbruik zal maken van de beschikbare systeembronnen. Als deze garantie niet
statisch gegeven kan worden, dan zal het raamwerk extra beveiligingschecks
in de code van de applicatie verweven die ervoor zorgen dat misbruik nooit
kan voorkomen.
Zoals de evaluatie aantoont, zijn onze beveiligingsmechanismen heel performant
en zeer compatibel met bestaande code. De code-injectietegenmaatregel heeft een
performantieoverhead van een paar percenten, en heeft een geheugenoverhead van
bijna nul percent. Het is zeer compatibel met bestaande code, zoals aangetoond
door de SPEC benchmark. De SxC-implementatie deelt dezelfde karakteristieken.
Als het systeem statisch kan aantonen dat een applicatie nooit de systeembronnen
zal misbruiken, dan zorgt het SxC-systeem voor geen enkele performantie- of
geheugenoverhead. Bij applicaties waar dat niet aangetoond kan worden, zullen
extra beveiligingschecks worden ingeweven. De overhead van deze extra checks zijn
bijna volledig afhankelijk van de complexiteit van de regels die moeten afgedwongen
worden. De SxC-implementatie is heel compatibel met bestaande code; er is geen
enkele applicatie gevonden die niet bleek te werken met het prototype.
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Chapter 1
Challenges in Mobile Phone
Security
Making sure that a large software system is secure, is a very difficult task. The
experience with desktop and server computers teaches us that the insecurity of a
system is often proportional to a number of things, including the size of the attack
surface (i.e. how easy it is for an attacker to ‘talk’ to the computer) and how much
freedom the user gets to install and execute applications.
Mobile phones are progressing at a rapid and steady pace, making them ever more
attractive to attackers. This chapter gives an introduction to the importance of
mobile phone security, and lays out the different challenges in this domain. It lists
the different goals that will have to be met in order to improve the security of mobile
devices, and highlights the contributions that are presented in this dissertation.
1.1 The Importance of Mobile Phone Security
In the timespan of just a few years, mobile phones have gone through an amazing
evolution. A decade ago, a mobile phone was an electronic brick that was barely
capable of supporting telephony functions like calling and messaging contacts. They
were relatively slow, and none of them supported colors. Fast forward to 2010, and
they are completely transformed to full-fledged multimedia devices with millions
of colors and often touch functionality. They support the playback of music and
video, offer support for taking and storing pictures, can connect to the internet,
have GPS capabilities, and allow users to install custom applications written by
3rd parties. Although this evolution is exciting, it also uncovers a number of flaws
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in the original operating systems and security mechanisms that have not changed
much in the last decade.
With hundreds of thousands of applications that can be downloaded and installed
on mobile phones, some of them are bound to be malicious in nature and others
might be susceptible to attacks. They can leak sensitive information like passwords,
emails, photos, or contact information. They can cost the owner of the phone
money, if they get access to paid services such as placing a call, sending a short
message and surfing the internet. Or they can become part of a botnet, constantly
sending SPAM or attacking other computers on the network.
One could argue that infecting a mobile phone is more advantageous for an attacker
than infecting a desktop computer. A mobile phone can do almost anything a
desktop computer can. Modern phones feature an ARM processor that runs at
speeds of up to 1GHz. They often run trimmed down versions of existing desktop
operating systems, but this does not hinder the attacker in any way. All the
networking and communication capabilities on mobile systems are present or even
enhanced, compared to desktop systems.
Mobile phones are also always connected to some kind of network. This can be
the cellular network, of course, but in many cases an internet connection (using
WiFi, or over the cellular network) or a Bluetooth connection is also available.
This increases the attack surface considerably, because all these different types of
networks require their own software stacks and applications.
Most mobile phones do not have virus scanners or other malware detection software,
and do not have a firewall to make sure that no application can open network
connections or starts listening for incoming connections. And even though many
phones support some kind of mechanism that allows operators to push or pull
software, these mechanisms are typically used to pull spyware from devices, rather
than pushing security fixes for the system.
A final problem is that mobile phones easily outnumber desktop and server
computers by a factor of 4 to 1. This, combined with the fact that only a small
number of different mobile phone operating systems exist, means that if a bug is
found in one operating system, hundreds of millions of devices can be exploited.
Because of all these reasons, it is paramount to make sure that all mobile phones
come with better security out of the box. This can be achieved in a number
of different ways, starting with user and developer education. However, this
dissertation will rather focus on the technical frameworks and tools that can be
improved upon.
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1.2 Challenges
The challenges that are faced on mobile phones are very similar as those on desktop
computers. The ramifications are, however, much worse. Security in the field of
mobile phones is more difficult and arguably more important than security on
desktop computer for a number of reasons.
Security Complacency Security problems on desktop computers are so
commonplace, that people assume they are at risk by simply using their computer.
They have accepted that things can —and probably will eventually— go wrong.
Not so with mobile phones. Because of a relatively good security track record
of mobile phones, most people are unaware that mobile devices face the same
security challenges that a computer does. This track record will likely worsen as
mobile phones get more open and more powerful than ever before, and people will
eventually catch up, but by then the damage may have already been done.
Software Vulnerabilities It is almost impossible (and certainly too costly) to
write software without bugs. Even the best teams of programmers write buggy
software, no matter how much attention to code quality, review of code, or
programmer education is given. Some of these programming bugs can be used by
an attacker to make the software misbehave. In this case, these bugs are called
vulnerabilities. Depending on the type of bug, attackers can crash an application
or the entire system, influence the control flow of the application (i.e. get access
to parts of the program that the attacker should not have gotten access to), or in
worst case even allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code.
Users are not security experts The easiest way for an attacker to execute code
on a system, is to simply ask the user to run it. Attackers often misdirect the
user by influencing the user interface or by somehow encouraging the user to make
the wrong decision. Users are no security experts, so they should not be asked to
make decisions that impact the security of their devices. In addition, the system
should be able to cope with malicious applications that are installed by the user.
Under no circumstances should a malicious application get unrestricted access to
the resources of a device.
Privacy Violations The privacy of users is particularly at risk when an attacker
succeeds in infiltrating a mobile device, more so than on a desktop computer. A
mobile phone stores confidential information such as contact information, emails
and text messages, notes, photos, . . . But if attackers control the system, they can
also listen in on phone conversations, track the user through the use of the GPS,
intercept and modify text messages, or anything else that the phone is capable of.
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Monetary Issues A final challenge that is much more prevalent on mobile phones
than on desktop computers, is the fact that an attack can actually cost the user
money. If the attacker starts sending text messages or placing phone calls to
premium numbers in dodgy countries, or starts sending internet traffic over the
cellular network, the mobile operator will charge the user for this.
If we wish to keep the security track record of mobile phones as good as it is today (or
even improve upon it), then it is necessary to build additional defenses into mobile
operating systems and the associated tools, that offer a better protection than the
state of the art. These are the challenges that we address in this dissertation.
1.3 Goals and Approach
The main goal of this dissertation is to improve upon the state of the art, in terms
of technical security mechanism and measures against attacks on or attacks by
software applications running on the mobile phone. There are two different ways to
approach this goal. New techniques can be implemented to fix the software that is
already out there. The advantage here is that it takes no or only a small effort to
update the huge amount of existing applications, but this approach can typically
only take you so far. The other option is to rethink everything from scratch. By
not having to be backwards compatible, better solutions can be designed and
implemented. The disadvantage is that it takes years for the bulk of the software
to switch to this new and improved system.
However, we must first show that security is an important topic for mobile phones.
An attacker who takes control over a mobile phone has unlimited access to all the
resources of the phone. This is a serious threat, and users often underestimate
the danger of this. So, before introducing new technical measures to increase the
security of the software stack, we must make the case for implementing new security
tools on mobile phones. Our approach is to show that even under harsh conditions
for attackers, they might still be able to mount a full and unrestricted attack on
the phone.
We want to build tools that can be used by phone manufacturers to secure their
applications. The key here is to make sure that it is more difficult for an attacker
to exploit a bug in the application. In other words, we want to make sure that bugs
do not become vulnerabilities. This can be accomplished in different ways, but our
approach is to implement a compiler extension that weaves in additional checks in
the binary code during the compilation process. These checks will counter many of
the common attack techniques that are used by attackers today.
In addition to minimizing the potential danger of bugs in applications, we also want
the phone to be secure in the presence of malicious applications. These applications
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are installed and executed by the user, and thus are much harder to detect than
other malware. We approach this problem by building a custom framework to
deploy applications on the phone. This framework must ensure that applications
conform to a predetermined system policy. One possibility is to attach a runtime
monitor to the application that is being deployed. By monitoring all the calls to
the resources of the phone, an application can be disallowed to abuse the system.
These goals must be met within the technical constraints of a mobile system. Hence,
all countermeasures, tools and frameworks must have a very good performance,
both in terms of speed overhead, memory overhead and power consumption.
They must also have a relatively low impact on the development process. Since we
cannot expect mobile phone manufacturers to rewrite their entire existing code
base, our security measures must be applicable without a lot of extra work.
1.4 Context and Technical Challenges
The goals that are listed in Section 1.3 stem from the limitations of existing security
architectures and tools. Depending on the tools and frameworks that are used to
write an application, different security concerns appear.
All applications can be divided into one of two classes. In the first class, called
unmanaged applications, the developer is responsible for correctly managing the
memory that is allocated to the application. This can be a difficult task, especially
in large software systems. One particular disadvantage of unmanaged applications,
is that small oversights in the program code might lead to so-called code injection
atttacks.
For a code injection attack to succeed, the application must contain a bug that gives
the attacker the ability to write data outside of the expected memory locations. This
can enable the attacker to overwrite interesting memory locations that influence
the control flow of the application. If an attacker can then somehow get malicious
program code into the memory of the application, he could influence the control
flow in such a way that the malicious code is executed. A more detailed description
of code injection attacks can be found in Section 2.2.
Some security frameworks for mobile phones require that applications are part
of the second class of applications: the so-called managed applications. These
applications run in a Virtual Machine (VM), which is a sandboxed environment
that guarantees a number of things including memory safety. Examples of Virtual
Machines are the .NET (Compact) Framework [69], the Java Platform [112], or the
Dalvik Virtual Machine [30]. Since attackers will not be able to write outside the
bounds of memory structures, they will not be able to influence the application’s
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control flow and a code injection attack becomes impossible. A more detailed
description of virtual machines can be found in Section 2.3.
Attackers must find other ways to attack these applications. One way is to simply
mislead users into installing and executing malicious applications. This turns out to
be a very successful attack vector, because users are often not very security-aware,
and it is extremely difficult for any security architecture to fend off attacks by
applications that the user has indicated he wants to run.
1.5 Assumptions and Attack Model
Throughout this dissertation, a number of assumptions are made about the attackers
we are trying to protect against. These assumptions can be summed up in a so-
called attack model. Section 1.4 introduced the two different classes in which
applications can be divided in. Each class has a different attack model.
Unmanaged Applications Writing secure software is difficult, especially when
that software is written in an unmanaged programming language. A number of
common programming mistakes can lead to successful attacks on the software,
where the attacker can force the program to execute arbitrary code of the his choice.
The attack model for unmanaged applications models an attacker as someone who
tries to gain unauthorized access to a system by trying to exploit a bug in an
unmanaged application.
The attack model consists of only one assumption: the attacker cannot write to code
memory. If the attacker can arbitrarily change the instructions of an application,
it is easy to rewrite the application in a way that any security checks are skipped.
Non-writable code memory is the standard today, so this assumption certainly does
not limit the applicability of our proposed solutions in any way.
The attack model defined here represents a very powerful attacker. In particular,
we assume that the attacker can read the contents of the entire memory range of
the application, and that data memory can be executed.
Managed Applications Attacking managed applications is more difficult because
of the extra security guarantees that are offered by the virtual machine. On a
system that requires all applications to be written in a managed language, it
is often easier for attackers to trick the user into installing malicious software
rather than trying to attack legitimate software. Hence, in the attack model for
managed systems, the attacker has succeeded in installing a malicious application
and running it like any other normal application.
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The only assumption in this attack model is that the virtual machine does not
contain bugs. That is, the attacker cannot find a way around the memory and
type safety features that are offered by the VM. He can also not exploit bugs in
the VM that could lead to native code injection attacks.
The attack model coincides completely with what a normal legitimate application
is allowed to do. This immediately implies that exploitable bugs in legitimate
applications will also be subject to the same restrictions that are imposed by the
security mechanisms we propose.
1.6 Main Contributions
The work in this dissertation focused around application security on mobile devices.
Security issues in both native applications and managed applications have been
investigated, and solutions have been proposed. The text in this dissertation is
structured in a way that reflects the three main contributions.
1.6.1 Alphanumeric and Turing Complete Shellcode
We prove that in code injection attacks where the attacker is severely limited in
the type of data he can use to inject his payload, arbitrary code execution can still
be achieved. Hence, intrusion detection systems that are based on the detection
of special patterns could possibly be bypassed by attackers, without limiting the
attacker in any way.
We show that for the ARM architecture, the subset of instructions that consist of
only alphanumeric bytes is Turing Complete. Thus, if an attacker can only use
such alphanumeric instructions, he is not limited at all in terms of computational
capabilities.
This work has been done in the context of a bilateral project between the DistriNet
research group and DOCOMO Euro-Labs. It has led to the publication of the
following paper:
• “Filter-resistant code injection on ARM”, Yves Younan, Pieter Philippaerts,
Frank Piessens, Wouter Joosen, Sven Lachmund, and Thomas Walter,
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 11-20, November 9-13, 2009
A subset of this work is also published as an article:
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• “Alphanumeric RISC ARM shellcode”, Yves Younan and Pieter Philippaerts,
Phrack Magazine, issue 66, June 11, 2009
1.6.2 A Countermeasure against Code Injection Attacks
We introduce a new countermeasure to protect applications against code injection
attacks. A modified compiler will emit extra security checks during the compilation
of a C application. These checks use a masking mechanism to assert that code
pointers cannot point to memory areas they should not point to. Even if an
attacker can somehow inject shellcode into the memory of an application, the
masking process will prevent the attacker from jumping to this injected code.
This work has been done in the context of a bilateral project between the DistriNet
research group and DOCOMO Euro-Labs. It has led to the following European
patent application:
• “Method and apparatus for preventing modification of a program execution
flow”, Pieter Philippaerts, Yves Younan, Frank Piessens, Sven Lachmund, and
Thomas Walter, Application no. 09161239.0-1245, Filing date 27/05/2009
The following paper is currently under submission:
• “Code Pointer Masking: Hardening Applications against Code Injection
Attacks”, Pieter Philippaerts, Yves Younan, Frank Piessens, Sven Lachmund,
and Thomas Walter, submitted to First ACM Conference on Data and
Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY) 2011
1.6.3 An Implementation and Evaluation of Security-by-
Contract
We have implemented and evaluated a full and efficient implementation of the new
Security-by-Contract (SxC) paradigm on the .NET Full and Compact Frameworks.
The SxC framework is a deployment framework for managed applications. It
tries to statically guarantee that an application will never violate a predetermined
system policy, which is designed to protect system resources from abuse. If the
framework cannot statically guarantee the compliance of the application with the
policy, additional security checks are embedded into the application that enforce
compliance.
This work has been done in the context of the European FP6 project ‘Security of
Software and Services for Mobile Systems (S3MS)’. It has led to the publication of
the following papers:
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• “A flexible security architecture to support third-party applications on mobile
devices”, Lieven Desmet, Wouter Joosen, Fabio Massacci, Katsiaryna Naliuka,
Pieter Philippaerts, Frank Piessens, and Dries Vanoverberghe, in Proceedings
of the 2007 ACM workshop on Computer security architecture, pages 19-28,
November 2, 2007
• “Security-by-contract on the .NET platform”, Lieven Desmet, Wouter Joosen,
Fabio Massacci, Pieter Philippaerts, Frank Piessens, Ida Siahaan, and Dries
Vanoverberghe, in Information security technical report, volume 13, issue 1,
pages 25-32, May 15, 2008
• “Security middleware for mobile applications”, Bart De Win, Tom Goovaerts,
Wouter Joosen, Pieter Philippaerts, Frank Piessens, and Yves Younan, in
Middleware for network eccentric and mobile applications, pages 265-284,
2009
• “A security architecture for Web 2.0 applications”, Lieven Desmet, Wouter
Joosen, Fabio Massacci, Katsiaryna Naliuka, Pieter Philippaerts, Frank
Piessens, Ida Siahaan, and Dries Vanoverberghe, in Towards the Future
Internet - A European Research Perspective, 2009
• “The S3MS.NET run time monitor: Tool demonstration”, Lieven Desmet,
Wouter Joosen, Fabio Massacci, Katsiaryna Naliuka, Pieter Philippaerts,
Frank Piessens, and Dries Vanoverberghe, in Electronic Notes in Theoretical
Computer Science, volume 253, issue 5, pages 153-159, December 1, 2009
1.6.4 Other Contributions
During the author’s PhD studies other research work has been done that is not
reported on in this dissertation. The author’s input in this work ranges from
significant contributions to mere guidance and supervision.
Cryptographic Extensibility in .NET The extensibility of the .NET cryptographic
API has been investigated in [85] and [18]. A number of design issues have been
uncovered, and backwards compatible suggestions have been offered.
Breaking the Memory Secrecy Assumption A number of countermeasures
against code injection attacks are built on the assumption that application memory
is secret and can never be read by an attacker. This myth is debunked in [111].
An Efficient Pointer Arithmetic Checker for C Programs A new countermeasure
is proposed in [125] to protect against buffer overflows in C programs. It works by
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instrumenting C-code with runtime checks that ensure no out-of-bounds calculations
occur during pointer arithmetic.
Hardware-optimized Buffer Overflow Protection A port of the existing Multi-
Stack countermeasure [126] from the x86 architecture to the ARM architecture
is described in [110]. By taking advantage of some of the features of the ARM
processor, the memory that is required to run the countermeasure can be reduced
severely.
1.7 Structure of this Dissertation
The structure of the rest of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 gives a
short introduction to the ARM processor, code injection attacks and security
architectures for mobile devices.
Chapter 3 proves that in code injection attacks where the attacker is severely limited
in the type of data he can use to inject his payload, arbitrary code execution can
still be achieved.
In Chapter 4, we introduce a new countermeasure to protect applications against
code injection attacks. A modified compiler introduces a masking mechanism to
assert that code pointers cannot point to memory they should not point to.
Our implementation of the Security-by-Contract paradigm on the .NET Framework
is described in Chapter 5. This prototype monitors the access of applications to
valuable resources, and optionally blocks access to these resources if the monitor
deems this necessary.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation.
Chapter 2
Background
To understand the contributions in this dissertation, some background knowledge is
assumed. This chapter gives an introduction to a selected number of more advanced
background topics that are specific to either mobile devices or application security.
Each section of this chapter introduces one particular topic that is important to
understand the rest of this dissertation. The different sections are independent
from each other, so the reader may pick and choose the different sections he wishes
to read, depending on his background.
Section 2.1 introduces the ARM architecture, which is the dominant processor
architecture for mobile devices. It gives a general overview of the architecture,
and zooms in on some specific features that are important to understand the
contributions in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Detailed information about the ARM
architecture can be found in the ARM Architecture Reference Manual [51].
Section 2.2 explains the basics of code injection attacks, and summarizes a number
of countermeasures that have been suggested to try to stop these attacks. Code
injection attacks will be the main theme of Chapter 4. A much more complete
overview of memory management errors and countermeasures can be found in [122].
Finally, Section 2.3 highlights the most common mobile security architectures. This
serves as general background information for Chapter 5, where we introduce a new
security architecture for mobile devices. Resources with detailed information about
the existing architectures are cited in the different subsections of Section 2.3.
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Register Purpose
r0 to r3 Temporary registers
r4 to r10 Permanent registers
r11 (alias fp) Frame pointer
r12 (alias ip) Intra-procedure call scratch register
r13 (alias sp) Stack pointer
r14 (alias lr) Link register
r15 (alias pc) Program counter
Table 2.1: The different general purpose ARM registers, and their intended purpose.
2.1 The ARM Architecture
The ARM architecture [102] is the dominating processor architecture for cell phones
and other embedded devices. It is a 32-bit RISC architecture developed by ARM
Ltd. and licensed to a number of processor manufacturers. Due to its low power
consumption and architectural simplicity, it is particularly suitable for resource
constrained and embedded devices. It absolutely dominates the market: 98% of
mobile devices feature at least one ARM processor [25].
ARM processors have traditionally been based on the Von Neumann architecture,
where data and code were stored in the memory regions. Starting from the ARM9
cores, the design has started moving to a Harvard architecture with separated
caches for code and data, which allows for higher clock frequencies.
2.1.1 Registers
The ARM processor features sixteen general purpose registers, numbered r0 to
r15. Apart from the program counter register, r15 or its alias pc, all registers can
be used for any purpose. There are, however, conventional roles assigned to some
particular registers. Table 2.1 gives an overview of the registers, their purpose, and
their optional alias. In addition to these general purpose registers, ARM processors
also contain the Current Program Status Register (CPSR). This register stores
different types of flags and condition values. This register cannot be addressed
directly.
2.1.2 Instructions
The ARM architecture has an atypically extensive and diverse set of instructions
for a RISC architecture. Instructions are pipelined into a multi-stage decoding and
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execution phase. Older ARM processors used a three-stage pipeline, whereas newer
versions use a pipeline of up to nine stages.
ARM processors can be enhanced with various co-processors. Each co-processor
offers its own set of instructions, and can be plugged seamlessly into the overall
architecture. If the main processor encounters an instruction that it does not
recognize, it sends the instruction to a co-processor bus to be executed. If none of
the co-processors recognize this instruction, the main processor raises an ‘invalid
instruction’ exception.
2.1.3 Function Calls
Due to the large number of registers, the ARM application binary interface stipulates
that the first four parameters of a function should be passed via registers r0 to r3.
If there are more than four parameters, the subsequent parameters will be pushed
on the stack. Likewise, the return address of a function is not always pushed on
the stack. The BL instruction, which calculates the return address and jumps to a
specified subroutine, will store the return address in register lr. It is then up to
the implementation of that subroutine to store the return address on the stack or
not.
2.1.4 Addressing Modes
ARM instructions share common ways to calculate memory addresses or values to
be used as operands for instructions. These calculations of memory addresses are
called addressing modes. A number of different addressing modes exist, some of
which will be explained in this section.
The ARM architecture is a 32-bit architecture, hence it is imperative that the
operands of instructions must be able to span the entire 32-bit addressing range.
However, since ARM instructions are 32 bits and a number of these bits are
used to encode the instruction OP code, operands and parameters, operands that
represent immediate values will never be able to store a full 32-bit value. To
overcome this problem, some addressing modes support different types of shifts
and rotations. These operations make it possible to quickly generate large numbers
(via bit shifting), without having to specify them as immediate values.
The following paragraphs will describe a number of addressing modes that are
used on ARM. These addressing modes are selected because they will be used
extensively in the rest of this dissertation.
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Addressing modes for data processing The first type of addressing mode is
the mode that is used for the data processing instructions. This includes the
instructions that perform arithmetic operations, the instructions that copy values
into registers, and the instructions that copy values between registers.
In the general case, a data processing instruction looks like this:
< i n s t r u c t i on> <Rd>, <Rn>, <sh i f t e r ope r and>
In this example, Rd is a placeholder for the destination register, and Rn represents
the base register.
The addressing mode is denoted in the above listing as the shifter operand. It
is twelve bits large and can be one of eleven subcategories. These subcategories
perform all kinds of different operations on the operand, such as logical and
arithmetic bit shifts, bit rotations, or no additional computation at all. Some
examples are given below:
mov r1 , #1
add r5 , r6 , r1 , LSL #2
sub r3 , r5 , #1
mov r0 , r3 , ROR r1
The first MOV instruction simply copies the value one into register r1. The form of
the MOV instruction is atypical for data processing instructions, because it does not
use the base register Rn.
The ADD instruction uses an addressing mode that shifts the value in r1 left by two
places. This result is added to the value stored in base register r6, and the result
is written to register r5.
The SUB instruction uses the same addressing mode as the first MOV instruction,
but also uses the base register Rn. In this case, the value one is subtracted from
the value in base register r5, and the result is stored in r3.
Finally, a second MOV operation rotates the value in r3 right by a number of places
as determined by the value in r1. The result is stored in r0.
Addressing modes for load/store The second type of addressing mode is used for
instructions that load data from memory and store data to memory. The general
syntax of these instructions is:
<LDR in s t r> <Rd>, addr mode
<STR in s t r> <Rd>, addr mode
The addr mode operand is the memory address where the data resides, and can be
calculated with one of nine addressing mode variants. Addresses can come from
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immediate values and registers (potentially scaled by shifting the contents), and
can be post- or pre-incremented.
Addressing modes for load/store multiple The third type of addressing mode
is used with the instructions that perform multiple loads and stores at once. The
LDM and STM instructions take a list of registers, and will either load data into the
registers in this list, or store data from these registers in memory. The general
syntax for multiple loads and stores looks like this:
<LDM ins t r><addr mode> <Rn>{ !} , <r e g i s t e r s>
<STM in s t r><addr mode> <Rn>{ !} , <r e g i s t e r s>
The addr mode operand can be one of the following four possibilities: increment
after (IA), increment before (IB), decrement after (DA), or decrement before (DB).
In all cases, Rn is used as the base register to start computing memory addresses
where the selected registers will be stored or loaded. The different addressing
modes specify different schemes of computing these addresses.
When the optional exclamation mark after the base register is present, the processor
will update the value in Rn to contain the newly computed memory address.
2.1.5 Conditional Execution
Almost every instruction on an ARM processor can be executed conditionally.
The four most-significant bits of these instructions encode a condition code that
specifies which condition should be met before executing the instruction. Prior to
actually executing an instruction, the processor will first check the CPSR register to
ensure that its contents corresponds to the status encoded in the condition bits of
the instruction. If the condition code does not match, the instruction is discarded.
The CPSR state can be updated by calling the CMP instruction, much like on the
Intel x86 architecture. This instruction compares a value from a register to a
value calculated in a shifter operand and updates the CPSR bits accordingly. In
addition to this, every other instruction that uses the addressing mode for data
processing can also optionally update the CPSR register. In this case, the result of
the instruction is compared to the value 0.
When writing ARM assembly, the conditional execution of an instruction is
represented by adding a suffix to the name of the instruction that denotes in
which circumstances it will be executed. Without this suffix, the instruction will
always be executed. If the instruction supports updating the CPSR register, the
additional suffix ‘S’ indicates that the instruction should update the CPSR register.
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The main advantage of conditional execution is the support for more compact
program code. As a short example, consider the following C fragment:
i f ( e r r != 0)
p r i n t f ( ” Errorcode = %i \n” , e r r ) ;
else
p r i n t f ( ”OK!\n” ) ;
By default, GCC compiles the above code to:
cmp r1 , #0
beq . L4
ldr r0 , <s t r i n g 1 add r e s s>
bl p r i n t f
b . L8
. L4 :
ldr r0 , <s t r i n g 2 add r e s s>
bl p r i n t f
. L8 :
The value in r1 contains the value of the err variable, and is compared to the
value 0. If the contents of r1 is zero, the code branches to the label .L4, where the
string ‘OK!’ is printed out. If the value in r1 is not zero, the BEQ instruction is
not executed, and the code continues to print out the ErrorCode string. Finally, it
branches to label .L8.
With conditional execution, the above code could be rewritten as:
cmp r1 , #0
ldrne r0 , <s t r i n g 1 add r e s s>
ldreq r0 , <s t r i n g 2 add r e s s>
bl p r i n t f
The ‘NE’ suffix means that the instruction will only be executed if the contents
of, in this case, r1 is not equal to zero. Similarly, the ‘EQ’ suffix means that the
instructions will be executed if the contents of r1 is equal to zero.
2.1.6 Thumb Instructions
In order to further increase code density, most ARM processors support a second
instruction set called the Thumb instruction set. These Thumb instructions are
16 bits in size, compared to the 32 bits of ordinary ARM instructions. Prior to
ARMv6, only the T variants of the ARM processor supported this mode (e.g.
ARM4T). However, as of ARMv6, Thumb support is mandatory.
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Instructions executed in 32-bit mode are called ARM instructions, whereas
instructions executed in 16-bit mode are called Thumb instructions. Unlike ARM
instructions, Thumb instructions do not support conditional execution.
2.2 Code Injection Attacks
Code injection attacks occur when an attacker can successfully divert the processor’s
control flow to a memory location whose contents is controlled by an attacker.
The only way an attacker can influence the control flow of the processor is by
overwriting locations in memory that store so-called code pointers. A code pointer
is a variable that contains the memory address of a function or some other location
in the application code where the processor will at some point jump to. Well-known
code pointers are the return address and function pointers.
There is a wide variety of techniques to achieve this, ranging from the classic
stack-based buffer overflow, to virtual function pointer overwrites, indirect pointer
overwrites, and so forth. An example of such an attack on a mobile phone is
Moore’s attack [72] against the Apple iPhone. This attack exploits LibTIFF
vulnerabilities [81, 82], and it could be triggered from both the phone’s mail client
and its web browser, making it remotely exploitable. A similar vulnerability was
found in the way GIF files were handled by the Android web browser [83].
In this section, we briefly describe the most basic type of code injection attack,
which occurs by writing outside the bounds of a buffer on the stack and overwriting
the return address. This type of attack can no longer be exploited in most cases, due
to the deployment of various countermeasures. However, it is very easy to explain,
and thus serves as a perfect illustration of the basics of a code injection attack. We
then discuss the widely deployed countermeasures, and also explain more advanced
attack techniques that can be used to get around these countermeasures.
2.2.1 Stack-based Buffer Overflows
When an array is declared in C, space is reserved for it and the array is manipulated
by means of a pointer to the first byte. No information about the array size is
available at runtime, and most C-compilers will generate code that will allow a
program to copy data beyond the end of an array, overwriting adjacent memory
space. If interesting information is stored somewhere in the adjacent memory space,
it could be possible for an attacker to overwrite it. On the stack this is usually the
case: it stores the addresses to resume execution after a function call has completed
its execution, i.e., the return address.
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Figure 2.1: A typical stack layout with two functions f0 and f1
For example, on the x86 and ARM architectures the stack grows down (i.e., newer
function calls have their variables stored at lower addresses than older ones). The
stack is divided into stackframes. Each stackframe contains information about the
current function: arguments of the called function, registers whose values must be
stored across function calls, local variables and the return address. This memory
layout is shown in Figure 2.1. An array allocated on the stack will usually be
located in the section of local variables of a stackframe. If a program copies data
past the end of this array, it will overwrite anything else stored before it and thus
will overwrite other data stored on the stack, like the return address [4].
If an attacker can somehow get binary code in the application’s memory space, then
he can use the above technique to overwrite a return address and divert the control
flow to his binary code that is stored somewhere in the application’s memory. This
binary code is called shellcode, and is typically a very short code fragment that
seeks to allow the attacker to execute arbitrary instructions with the same privilege
level as the application. A common way of getting this shellcode in the memory
space of the application is by giving it as input to the application. This input is
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then typically copied to the stack or the heap, where the attacker can then divert
the control flow to.
2.2.2 Countermeasures and Advanced Attacks
The stack-based buffer overflow attack described above is the oldest and best-known
code injection attack. However, more advanced attack techniques follow a similar
pattern in the sense that at some point a code pointer gets overwritten.
Stack Canaries Stack canaries were introduced specifically to counter the threat
of stack-based buffer overflows [27, 29]. The countermeasure works by introducing
a secret random value on the stack, right before the return address. If an attacker
uses a stack-based buffer overflow to overwrite the return address, he will also have
to overwrite the canary that is placed between the buffer and the return address.
When a function exits, it checks whether the canary has been corrupted. If so, the
application is killed before the modified return address is used.
The initial implementations of stack canaries were foiled by using indirect pointer
overwrite attacks. The attack worked if an attacker was able to overwrite a pointer
and an integer value that were located on the stack between the buffer that has
been overflown and the canary. If the application code later uses that pointer to
store the value of the integer somewhere in memory, the return address can still be
overwritten without invalidating the canary. The attacker can overwrite the pointer
to point to the memory location that contains the return address, and he can
overwrite the integer with the address of his shellcode. When the application later
uses the pointer and writes the value of the integer at the dereferenced location, it
effectively overwrites the return address with the address of the attacker’s shellcode.
ProPolice [42] is the most popular variation of the stack canaries countermeasure. It
reorders the local variables of a function on the stack, in order to provide protection
against indirect pointer overwrite attacks.
However, even ProPolice is still vulnerable to information leakage such as buffer-
overreads [111] and format string vulnerabilities [62]. Since ProPolice only protects
stack frames, it will not stop attacks that do not target the stack (for example,
heap-based buffer overflows).
ProPolice will also not emit the canary for every function. Only functions that
manipulate buffers (and hence are vulnerable to a buffer overflow attack) are
protected this way. However, sometimes the heuristics in the compilers are wrong
and do not protect functions that are vulnerable to attack1. In this case, it is
trivial for the attacker to overwrite the return address [105].
1CVE-2007-0038
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Even in the absence of circumstances that allow an attacker to circumvent the
protection of ProPolice, only the stack is protected against buffer overflows.
However, buffer overflows in other memory regions like the heap [7] or the data
segment [91] are also possible. Attackers have also been able to exploit format
string vulnerabilities [97], dangling pointer references [33] and integer errors [17] to
achieve similar results.
Address Space Layout Randomization The aim of Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR) [13] is not to stop buffer overflows, but rather to make
it much harder for attackers to exploit them. By randomizing the base address
of important structures such as the stack, heap, and libraries, attackers will have
difficulties finding their injected shellcode in memory. Even if they succeed in
overwriting a code pointer, they will not know where to point it to.
ASLR is an excellent countermeasure to have, especially because it raises the
security bar with no performance cost. However, there are different ways to get
around the protection it provides. Like all countermeasures that rely on random
or secret values, ASLR is susceptible to information leakage. In particular, buffer-
overreads [111] and format string vulnerabilities [62] are a problem for ASLR.
On 32-bit architectures, the amount of randomization is not prohibitively large [99].
This enables attackers to successfully perform a code injection attack by simply
guessing addresses. Eventually, the attack will succeed. New attacks also use a
technique called heap-spraying [46, 87, 101]. Attackers pollute the heap by filling
it with numerous copies of their shellcode, and then jump to somewhere on the
heap. Because most of the memory is filled with their shellcode, there is a good
chance that the jump will land on an address that is part of their shellcode.
Non-executable memory Modern processors often support marking memory
pages as non-executable. Even if the attacker can inject shellcode into the
application and jump to it, the processor would refuse to execute it. There
is no performance overhead when using this countermeasure, and it raises the
security bar quite a bit.
There are some problems with this countermeasure though. Some processors still
do not have this feature, and even if it is present in hardware, operating systems
do not always turn it on by default. Linux supports non-executable memory, but
many distributions do not use it, or only use it for some memory regions. A reason
for not using it, is that it breaks applications that expect the stack or heap to be
executable.
But even applications that use non-executable memory are vulnerable to attack.
Instead of injecting code directly, attackers can inject a specially crafted fake
stack. If the application starts unwinding the stack, it will unwind the fake stack
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instead of the original calling stack. This allows an attacker to direct the processor
to library functions and choose which parameters are passed to these functions,
giving him effectively unlimited control over the processor. This type of attack
is referred to as a return-into-libc attack [119]. A related attack is called return-
oriented programming [98], where a similar effect is achieved by filling the stack
with return addresses to specifically chosen locations in code memory that execute
some instructions and then perform a return. Other attacks exist that bypass
non-executable memory by first marking the memory where they injected their
code as executable, and then jumping to it [6, 100], or by disabling non-executable
memory altogether [105].
Other Countermeasures Many other countermeasures have been developed to
counter the threat of buffer overflows and code injection attacks [40, 123], but have
not found their way into the mainstream. These countermeasures typically offer a
performance/security trade-off that is too small to justify their use. Either they
offer a good protection against attacks but perform badly, or they perform very
well but offer too little extra security benefits.
Some countermeasures aim to prevent the vulnerability from becoming exploitable
by verifying that an exploitation attempt has occurred: via bounds checking
[53, 94, 125]. Others will make it harder for an attacker to execute injected code
by randomizing the base address of memory regions [15], encrypting pointers [28],
code [10, 54] or even all objects [14] while in memory and decrypting them before
use. While yet other types of countermeasures will try and ensure that the program
adheres to some predetermined policy [1, 56, 86].
Attackers have found ways of bypassing many of these countermeasures. These
bypasses range from overwriting control flow information not protected by
the countermeasure [21, 90], to guessing or leaking the secret associated with
countermeasures [99, 107, 111], to executing existing code rather than injecting
code [20, 98, 103, 119], to performing intricate attacks that make use of properties of
higher level languages (like JavaScript in the webbrowser) to create an environment
suitable to exploit a low-level vulnerability [106].
2.3 Mobile Security Architectures
The security architecture of a mobile phone is the key component that will try to
mitigate, if not avoid, any harm that a malicious application can inflict. However,
due to the constraints in processing power, they typically cannot be as elaborate as
security architectures on modern desktop computers. In addition, the user model
is also quite different, because mobile phones are oriented towards a single user,
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whereas desktop PCs support multiple user accounts. Hence, new architectures
must be designed to cope with these limitations and characteristics.
Even the older phone operating systems supported some kind of application security
mechanisms. This mechanism, albeit relatively primitive, has developed into the
de facto standard of the industry. Only recently have newer approaches been
introduced, Android’s being one of the more interesting ones. In this section, we
discuss both the traditional mechanism and the newer mechanisms introduced with
more recent phones.
2.3.1 Application Signing
The traditional way of doing application security on mobile phones, is called
application signing. It is the dominant security architecture, and is present in
Symbian devices and Windows CE devices. Because of the domination of Symbian-
based phones, this technique is often referred to as Symbian Signing [64]. For the
remaining of this section, we will look at how it is implemented on Windows CE,
but the implementations on other systems are very similar.
The security system of Windows CE [71] can run in different modes, depending on
the needs of the user. In the more secure ‘two-tier’ mode, applications can be run
in a trusted or partially trusted context. In a trusted context, an application runs
unrestricted, whereas in a partially trusted context it is prohibited from accessing
a predefined set of sensitive services, thus limiting the amount of damage it can
do. However, partially trusted applications are still allowed to access a number of
APIs that can cause damage to the system or to the user. For instance, they can
make phone calls or send short messages without limitation.
In Windows CE, applications can be signed with a digital signature, or unsigned.
When an application is started, the operating system checks the digital signature on
the executable. If the signature traces back to a certificate in the trusted certificate
store, the application is executed in a trusted context. Likewise, if the signature
traces back to a certificate in the untrusted certificate store, the application is
executed in a partially trusted context. If the signer is unknown, if the signature
is invalid, or if no signature is present, the operating system will ask the user
whether the application should be executed. When the user indicates that the
system should run the application, it is executed in a partially trusted context.
This signature-based system does not work well for modern phones where users can
install any application written by anyone. The first problem is that the decision
of allowing an application to run or not, is too difficult for a user to make. She
would like to run an application as long as the application does not misbehave or
does not violate some kind of policy. But she is not in a position to know what the
MOBILE SECURITY ARCHITECTURES 23
downloaded application exactly does, so she cannot make an educated decision to
allow or disallow the execution of a program.
A second problem is that certifying an application by a trusted third party is rather
expensive. Many of the mobile application developers are small companies that do
not have the resources to certify their applications.
A third, and perhaps most damning, problem is that these digital signatures do not
have a precise meaning in the context of security. They confer some degree of trust
about the origin of the software, but they say nothing about how trustworthy the
application is. Cases are already known where malware was signed by a commercial
trusted third party [43, 88]. This malware would have no problems passing through
the Windows CE security architecture, without a user noticing anything.
This security architecture does a decent job when it is rare that new applications are
installed on a phone, and when there are only a very limited number of application
developers. But it completely breaks down in the new environment where there
are tens of thousands of application developers. Also, the form of sandboxing that
it offers is by far too coarse grained to be useful in modern scenarios.
2.3.2 Sandboxing with Virtual Machines
Code injection attacks through memory management vulnerabilities have been
around for decades, and security architectures such as application signing do not
stop these attacks at all. A number of solutions and countermeasures have been
proposed, as discussed in Section 2.2. However, these proposals are typically too
slow or only offer partial protection. After almost 25 years of research, it turns out
that it seems impossible to find a good solution that remains fully compatible with
existing code.
In order to completely solve the problem, a redesign of the C programming language
is necessary to make it safe. These safe languages, also called managed languages,
try to increase software reliability and security by offering extra guarantees about
the state of the memory and about how the application can interact with it. In
particular, type safety is checked at compile time and runtime, and extra checks
are emitted in the application code to make sure out of bound memory operations
are not possible. In addition, the use of pointers is severely constrained. These
changes incur a performance hit and are not backwards compatible, but they offer
(provable) full protection against memory management errors.
Managed languages require a software infrastructure in order to work, called a
virtual machine (VM). The virtual machine offers a sandboxed environment for
applications to run in. Because of the memory safety guarantees, applications will
not be able to break out of their sandbox. In addition, a virtual machine also often
offers extra services such as garbage collection.
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The two most popular virtual machines on desktop computers are the Java
Framework and the .NET Framework. Both platforms are also available for
mobile phones (called respectively Java Micro Edition, and the .NET Compact
Framework), albeit in a stripped down version. There is a trend in the mobile phone
industry to force third party developers to use one of these frameworks. Starting
from Windows Phone 7 Series, Microsoft requires all third party applications to be
written in one of the .NET languages that target the .NET Compact Framework.
Similarly, all applications on the Android operating system must be written to run
on the Dalvik virtual machine.
Executing applications in a virtual machine solves all the problems related to
memory management vulnerabilities, however it does not solve all security problems.
Even though an application will not be able to do whatever it likes, there are still a
number of things that they can do that can potentially cause damage to the owner
of the mobile phone in some way. Examples of this behavior might be sending
short messages or calling toll numbers without the user’s knowledge, listening in on
conversations and sending them to a third party, stealing or destroying documents
stored on the phone, ... Although the full version of the .NET Framework has
a mechanism, called Code Access Security (CAS, [44]), to limit the capabilities
of specific applications, this security measure is not implemented on the .NET
Compact Framework for performance reasons. However, applications can use the
signing mechanismn presented in Section 2.3.1, which is effectively a very coarse
grained alternative.
2.3.3 The Mobile Information Device Profile
In contrast to the .NET Compact Framework, the Java Micro Edition has
a mechanism to limit the capabilities of specific applications. Java’s Mobile
Information Device Profile (MIDP) [113] for Java ME specifies a security
architecture that relates to Symbian signing, but is more fine grained.
MIDlets — applications that adhere to the MIDP specification — can be assigned
a set of permissions. These permissions are defined by the class library, and can
be extended as needed. The set of permissions that is assigned to a particular
MIDlet is called a protection domain. At runtime, the different security-relevant
functions of the Java ME Framework check whether the MIDlet has the appropriate
permissions in its protection domain before executing. If the permissions are
found, the function call is executed and the result is returned. If the permissions
are not found, the user is asked to make a decision. He can choose to allow the
function call once, all the time, or never. If the user chooses to not allow the call,
a SecurityException is thrown.
The MIDP framework supports the creation of multiple protection domains, each
with their own predefined set of permissions. When a MIDlet is started, it is
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automatically assigned to one of these protection domains, depending on its digital
signature. If no digital signature is present, the MIDlet is assigned the ‘Untrusted’
protection domain. In this case, the user is consulted for all permission assignments.
There are a number of differences between Symbian signing and the MIDP approach.
With Symbian signing, the permissions are assigned at program startup. Any and
all user interaction takes place at that point. The permission sets are hard-coded
in the operating system, and are not extensible. The MIDP framework on the
other hand will ask for user input at the point that the permission is actually
needed. Permission sets are not hard-coded and can be extended by class library
developers.
2.3.4 Android’s Permissions-based Scheme
Android [47] is the mobile phone platform that has been introduced late 2008 by a
consortium led by Google. It aims to replace all the different software stacks that
each mobile operator has, and substitute it with a single platform. Android has an
open philosophy, which means that it is open source and that they encourage users
to write applications for it and publish them.
The Android software stack runs on top of a Linux kernel, specially tuned for
mobile devices. The software stack consists of a set of libraries and a Java-like
virtual machine called Dalvik. All applications are run inside this virtual machine,
and can access the different libraries through a managed Java interface.
In addition to the major memory safety advantages, the Virtual Machine also offers
a permission-based system for critical APIs [38]. Like in the full Java framework,
the permission-based system checks all incoming requests into the library and
can optionally reject them if the calling application does not have the required
privileges.
As a consequence of the limited capabilities of mobile phones, Android’s permission
system does not implement the stack inspection mechanism that is present in the
full Java framework. It does, however, feature a similar but simplified system.
Applications run without permissions by default. They can request new permissions
by specifying them in the AndroidManifest.xml file that is associated with the
application. During the installation of the application, the system either grants
the requested permissions or not, depending on the signature of the installation
package or user interaction. Permissions are granted only at installation time; no
changes to the permission set are made when the application is started. When an
application is running and tries to access a privileged method, the virtual machine
checks whether the application has the necessary permission that is required to
perform the action. If it does not have the permission, an exception is thrown.
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All applications on Android must be signed with a digital signature. However, in
contrast with the approach described in Section 2.3.1, the signature on Android does
not imply that an application is safe to install or not. Instead, it is used solely to
determine which applications are developed by the same person or company. Hence,
the signature certificates are not required to be published by commercial certificates
authorities, as self-signed certificates will fit the required purpose perfectly.
Each Android application runs under a unique Linux user ID. This enforces that
different programs cannot access each other’s data. If two applications need to
share the same data, they can request to share a common user ID. Only programs
that are signed by the same developer are allowed to share a user ID.
The Android security model is much more granular than the application signing
approach. Even if the user allows an application to be installed on the system, the
application does not necessarily get access to all the functionality of the device. At
most, it gets access to the functionality it requests. And even this can be limited
further by the user.
2.3.5 Advanced Security Architectures
A number of other security architectures and tools have been proposed in the
literature to guarantee the security of mobile devices. F-Secure is one of the
anti-virus companies that sells a mobile version of their software for Windows
Mobile, Symbian and Android. Bose et al. [19] developed a mechanism based on
support vector machines, where application behavior is analyzed and compared
to the behavior of mobile viruses. When the system detects malicious behavior,
the application is killed. Cheng et al. [22] and Schmidt et al. [96] propose systems
where the communication behavior is monitored and sent to a central server. This
server then analyzes the data and compares it to data of other devices. In this way,
an epidemic can easily be detected.
Muthukumaran et al. [74] and Zhang et al. [127] build on the concepts that
are present in SELinux to build a secure mobile phone software architecture.
They demonstrate that it is possible to write security policies and protect critical
applications from untrusted code. Becher et al. [12] implemented a security system
on Windows CE, based on kernel-level function call interception. It can be used
to enforce more expressive policies than those that are allowed by the default
Windows CE security architecture.
Enck et al. [37] improve the existing Android security architecture by detecting
requests for dangerous combinations of permissions. When an application is
installed, their Kirin system matches the requested permissions with a set of
permission combinations that are considered to be dangerous. Ongtang et al. [80]
further improve the Android security architecture with runtime checks.
Chapter 3
Filter-resistant Shellcode
With the rapid spread of mobile devices, the ARM processor has become the
most widespread 32-bit CPU core in the world. ARM processors offer a great
trade-off between power consumption and processing power, which makes them
an excellent candidate for mobile and embedded devices. About 98% of mobile
phones and personal digital assistants feature at least one ARM processor. The
ARM architecture is also making inroads into more high-end devices, such as tablet
PCs, netbooks, and in the near future perhaps even servers [109].
Only recently, however, have these devices become powerful enough to let users
connect over the internet to various services, and to share information as we are
used to on desktop PCs. Unfortunately, this introduces a number of security risks:
mobile devices are more and more subject to external attacks that aim to control
the behavior of the device.
A very important class of such attacks is code injection attacks (see Section 2.2).
Attackers abuse a bug in an application to divert the processor from the normal
control flow of the application. Typically, the processor is diverted to shellcode,
which is often placed in the memory of the application by sending it as input to
the application.
A common hurdle for exploit writers, is that the shellcode has to pass one or more
filtering methods before being stored into memory. The shellcode enters the system
as data, and various validations and transformations can be applied to this data.
An example is an input validation filter that matches the input with a given regular
expression, and blocks any input that does not match. A popular regular expression
for example is [a-zA-Z0-9] (possibly extended by “space”). Other examples are text
encoding filters that encode input into specific character encodings (e.g. UTF-8),
and filters that make sure that the input is of a specific type (e.g. valid HTML).
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Clearly, for a code injection attack to succeed, the shellcode must survive all these
validations and transformations. The key contribution of this chapter is that it
shows that it is possible to write powerful shellcode that passes such filters. More
specifically, we show that the subset of ARM machine code programs that (when
interpreted as data) consist only of alphanumerical characters (i.e. letters and
digits) is a Turing complete subset. This is a non-trivial result, as the ARM is a
RISC architecture with fixed width instructions of 32 bits, and hence the number
of instructions that consist only of alphanumeric characters is very limited.
The research presented in this chapter has been conducted in the context of a
bilateral project between the DistriNet research group and DOCOMO Euro-Labs.
The contents of this chapter builds on the general introduction to the ARM
architecture presented in Section 2.1.
3.1 Alphanumeric Instructions
In most cases, alphanumeric bytes are likely to get through conversions and filters
unmodified. Therefore, having shellcode with only alphanumeric instructions is
sometimes necessary and often preferred.
An alphanumeric instruction is an instruction where each of the four bytes of the
instruction is either an upper case or lower case letter, or a digit. In particular,
the bit patterns of these bytes must always conform to the following constraints:
• The most significant bit, bit 7, must be set to 0.
• Bit 6 or 5 must be set to 1.
• If bit 5 is set to 1, but bit 6 is set to 0, then bit 4 must also be set to 1.
These constraints do not eliminate all non-alphanumeric characters, but they can
be used as a rule of thumb to quickly dismiss most of the invalid bytes. Each
instruction will have to be checked whether its bit pattern follows these conditions
and under which circumstances.
It is worth emphasizing that these constraints are tough: only 0.34% of the 32-bit
words consist of 4 alphanumerical bytes.
This section will discuss some of the difficulties of writing alphanumeric code.
When we discuss the bits in a byte, we will maintain the definition as introduced
above: the most significant bit in a byte is bit 7 and the least significant bit is bit
0. Bits 31 to 24 form the first byte of an ARM instruction, and bits 7 to 0 form
the last byte.
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The ARM processor (in its v6 incarnation) has 147 instructions. Most of these
instructions cannot be used in alphanumeric code, because at least one of the four
bytes of the instruction is not alphanumeric. In addition, we have also filtered out
instructions that require a specific version of the ARM processor, in order to keep
our work as broadly applicable as possible.
3.1.1 Registers
In alphanumeric code, not all instructions that take registers as operands can use
any register for any operand. In particular, none of the data-processing instructions
can take registers r0 to r2 and r8 to r15 as the destination register Rd. The reason
is that the destination register is encoded in the four most significant bits of the
third byte of an instruction. If these bits are set to the value 0, 1 or 2, this would
generate a byte that is too small to be alphanumerical. If the bits are set to a
value greater than 7, the resulting byte value will be too high.
If these registers cannot be set as the destination registers, this essentially means
that any calculated value cannot be copied into one of these registers using the
data-processing instructions. However, being able to set the contents of some of
these registers is very important. As explained in Section 2.1, ARM uses registers
r0 to r3 to transfer parameters to functions and system calls.
In addition, registers r4 and r6 can in some cases also generate non-alphanumeric
characters. The only registers that can be used without restrictions are limited to
r3, r5 and r7. This means that we only have three registers that we can use freely
throughout the program.
3.1.2 Conditional Execution
Because the condition code of an instruction is encoded in the most significant bits
of the first byte of the instruction (bits 31-28), the value of the condition code has
a direct impact on the alphanumeric properties of the instruction. As a result, only
a limited set of condition codes can be used in alphanumeric shellcode. Table 3.1
shows the possible condition codes and their corresponding bit patterns.
Unfortunately, the condition code AL, which specifies that an instruction should
always be executed, cannot be used. This means that all alphanumeric ARM
instructions must be executed conditionally. From the 15 possible condition codes,
only five can be used: CC (Carry clear), MI (Negative), PL (Positive), VS (Overflow)
and VC (No overflow). This means that we can only execute instructions if the
correct condition codes are set and that the conditions that can be used when
attempting conditional control flow are limited.
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Bit Pattern Name Description
0000 EQ Equal
0001 NE Not equal
0010 CS/HS Carry set/unsigned higher or same
0011 CC/LO Carry clear/unsigned lower
0100 MI Minus/negative
0101 PL Plus/positive or zero
0110 VS Overflow
0111 VC No overflow
1000 HI Unsigned higher
1001 LS Unsigned lower or same
1010 GE Signed greater than or equal
1011 LT Signed less than
1100 GT Signed greater than
1101 LE Signed less than or equal
1110 AL Always (unconditional)
1111 (used for other purposes)
Table 3.1: The different condition codes of an ARM processor.
3.1.3 The Instruction List
Appendix A contains a table with the full list of ARMv6 instructions and whether
they are suitable for alphanumeric shellcode or not. From this list of 147 instructions,
we will now remove all instructions that require a specific ARM architecture version
and all the instructions that we have disqualified based on whether or not they
have bit patterns which are incompatible with alphanumeric characters.
For each instruction, the ARM reference manual specifies which bits must be set
to 0 or 1, and which bits should be set to 0 or 1 (defined as SBZ or SBO in the
manual). However, on our test processor if we set a bit marked as “should be”
to something else, the processor throws an undefined instruction exception. In
our discussion, we have treated “should be” and “must be” as equivalent, but we
still note the difference in the instruction list in Appendix A in case this behavior
is different on other processors (since this would enable the use of many more
instructions).
Removing the incompatible instructions leaves us with 18 instructions: B/BL, CDP,
EOR, LDC, LDM(1), LDM(2), LDR, LDRB, LDRBT, LDRT, MCR, MRC, RSB, STM(2), STRB,
STRBT, SUB, SWI.
Even though they can be used alphanumerically, some of the instructions have no
or only limited use in the context of shellcode:
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• B/BL the branch instruction uses the last 24 bits as an offset to the program
counter to calculate the destination of the jump. After making these bits
alphanumeric, the instruction would have to jump at least 12MB1 from the
current location, far beyond the scope of our shellcode.
• CDP is used to tell the coprocessor to do some kind of data processing. Since
we cannot know which coprocessors may be available or not on a specific
platform, we discard this instruction as well.
• LDC the load coprocessor instruction loads data from consecutive memory
addresses into a coprocessor.
• MCR/MRC move coprocessor registers to and from ARM registers. While
this instruction could be useful for caching purposes (more on this later), it
is a privileged instruction before ARMv6.
The remaining thirteen instructions can be categorized in groups that contain
instructions with the same basic functionality but that only differ in the details.
For instance, LDR loads a word from memory into a register whereas LDRB loads
a byte into the least significant bytes of a register. Even though these are two
different instructions, they perform essentially the same operation.
We can distinguish the following seven categories:
• EOR Exclusive OR
• LDM (LDM(1), LDM(2)) Load multiple registers from a consecutive
memory locations
• LDR (LDR, LDRB, LDRBT, LDRT) Load a value from memory into
a register
• STM Store multiple registers to consecutive memory locations
• STRB (STRB, STRBT) Store a register to memory
• SUB (SUB, RSB) Subtract
• SWI Software Interrupt a.k.a. do a system call
Unfortunately, the instructions in the list above are not always alphanumeric.
Depending on which operands are used, these functions may still generate
characters that are non-alphanumeric. Hence, additional constraints apply to
each instruction. In the following paragraphs, we discuss these constraints for the
different instructions in the groups.
1The branch instruction will first shift the 24 bit offset left twice because all instructions
start on a 4 byte boundary. This means that the smallest possible value we can provide as offset
(0x303030) will in fact be an offset of 12632256.
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EOR
0 I0 0 0 0 1 Scond shifter_operandRn Rd
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 16 15 12 11 02831
EOR{<cond>}{S} <Rd>, <Rn>, <shifter_operand>
In order for the second byte to be alphanumeric, the S bit must be set to
1. If this bit is set to 0, the resulting value would be less than 47, which is
not alphanumeric. Rn can also not be a register higher than r9. Since Rd
is encoded in the first four bits of the third byte, it may not start with a 1.
This means that only the low registers can be used. In addition, register r0
to r2 can not be used, because this would generate a byte that is too low to
be alphanumeric. The shifter operand must be tweaked, such that its most
significant four bytes generate valid alphanumeric characters in combination
with Rd. The eight least significant bits are, of course, also significant as they
fully determine the fourth byte of the instruction. Details about the shifter
operand can be found in the ARM architecture reference manual [63].
LDM(1), LDM(2)
0 01 P U 0 W 1cond register listRn
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 16 15 02831
LDM{<cond>}<addressing_mode> <Rn>{!}, <registers>
0 01 P U 1 0 1cond shifter_operandRn 0
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 16 15 14 02831
LDM{<cond>}<addressing_mode> <Rn>,
<registers_without_pc>ˆ
The list of registers that is loaded into memory is stored in the last two bytes
of the instructions. As a result, not any list of registers can be used. In
particular, for the low registers, r7 can never be used. r6 or r5 must be used,
and if r6 is not used, r4 must be used. The same goes for the high registers.
Additionally, the U bit must be set to 0 and the W bit to 1, to ensure that
the second byte of the instruction is alphanumeric. For Rn, registers r0 to
r9 can be used with LDM(1), and r0 to r10 can be used with LDM(2).
LDR, LDRB, LDRBT, LDRT
1 I0 P U 0 W 1cond addr_modeRn Rd
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 16 15 12 11 02831
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LDR{<cond>} <Rd>, <addressing_mode>
1 I0 P U 1 W 1cond addr_modeRn Rd
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 16 15 12 11 02831
LDR{<cond>}B <Rd>, <addressing_mode>
1 I0 0 U 1 1 1cond addr_modeRn Rd
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 16 15 12 11 02831
LDR{<cond>}BT <Rd>, <post_indexed_addressing_mode>
1 I0 0 U 0 1 1cond addr_modeRn Rd
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 16 15 12 11 02831
LDR{<cond>}T <Rd>, <post_indexed_addressing_mode>
The details of the addressing mode are described in the ARM reference manual
and will not be repeated here for brevity’s sake. However, the addressing
mode must be specified in a way such that the fourth byte of the instruction
is alphanumeric, and the least significant four bits of the third byte generate
a valid character in combination with Rd. Rd cannot be one of the high
registers, and cannot be r0-r2. The U bit must also be 0.
STM, STRB, STRBT
0 01 P U 1 0 0cond register listRn
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 16 15 02831
STM{<cond>}<addressing_mode> <Rn>, <registers>ˆ
1 I0 P U 1 W 0cond addr_modeRn Rd
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 16 15 12 11 02831
STR{<cond>}B <Rd>, <addressing_mode>
1 I0 0 U 1 1 0cond addr_modeRn Rd
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 16 15 12 11 02831
STR{<cond>}BT <Rd>, <post_indexed_addressing_mode>
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The structure of STM is very similar to the structure of the LDM operation,
and the structure of STRB(T) is very similar to LDRB(T). Hence, comparable
constraints apply. The only difference is that other values for Rn must be
used in order to generate an alphanumeric character for the third byte of the
instruction.
SUB, RSB
0 I0 0 0 1 0 Scond shifter_operandRn Rd
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 16 15 12 11 02831
SUB{<cond>}{S} <Rd>, <Rn>, <shifter_operand>
0 I0 0 0 1 1 Scond shifter_operandRn Rd
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 16 15 12 11 02831
RSB{<cond>}{S} <Rd>, <Rn>, <shifter_operand>
To get the second byte of the instruction to be alphanumeric, Rn and the
S bit must be set accordingly. In addition, Rd cannot be one of the high
registers, or r0-r2. As with the previous instructions, we refer to the ARM
architecture reference manual [63] for a detailed instruction of the shifter
operand.
SWI
1 11 1cond immed_24
27 26 25 24 23 02831
SWI{<cond>} <immed_24>
As will become clear further in this chapter, it was essential for us that the first
byte of the SWI call is alphanumeric. Fortunately, this can be accomplished
by using one of the condition codes discussed in the previous section. The
other three bytes are fully determined by the immediate value that is passed
as the operand of the SWI instruction.
3.1.4 Self-modifying Code
One interesting way to get around the constraints of alphanumeric code, is to
generate non-alphanumeric code using alphanumeric instructions, and then execute
this non-alphanumeric code. The shellcode can contain a number of dummy
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instructions, which can then be overwritten by other instructions to form non-
alphanumeric instructions. Code that changes instructions at runtime is called
self-modifying code.
ARM processors have an instruction cache, which makes writing self-modifying code
a hard thing to do since all the instructions that are being executed will most likely
already have been cached. The Intel x86 architecture has a specific requirement
to be compatible with self-modifying code, and as such will make sure that when
code is modified in memory the cache that possibly contains those instructions is
invalidated. ARM has no such requirement, meaning that the instructions that
have been modified in memory could be different from the instructions that are
actually executed. Given the size of the instruction cache and the proximity of
the modified instructions, it is very hard to write self-modifying shellcode without
having to flush the instruction cache. We discuss how to do this in section 3.2.7
3.2 Writing Shellcode
In the previous section, we have sketched some of the problems that arise when
writing alphanumeric code. However, there still are some problems that are
specifically associated with writing shellcode. When the shellcode starts up, we
know nothing about the program state, we do not know the value of any registers
(including CPSR), the state of memory or anything else. This presents us with a
number of important challenges to solve. This section will introduce a number of
solutions for these problems. In addition, this section will show how to use the
limited instructions that are available to simulate the operations of a much richer
instruction set.
3.2.1 Conditional Execution
One way to make sure that a conditional instruction is executed, without knowing
the value of the status register, is by duplicating instructions with mutually exclusive
and also exhaustive condition codes. In our implementation, we have chosen the
condition codes PL and MI. Instructions marked with PL will only be executed if
the condition status is positive or zero. In contrast, MI instructions will only be
executed if the condition status is negative. Clearly, this combination of condition
codes is both mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
When our shellcode starts up, we can not be sure what state the CPSR register is
in. Every instruction we want to be executed is added twice to the shellcode: a
first time with a PL condition and a second time with a MI condition. Independent
of what the contents of the status register is, exactly one of these instructions will
be executed.
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Once we gain more knowledge about the program state, we can execute an
instruction that we know the result of, and mark it as an instruction that must
update the CPSR register. This can be done, for example, by setting the S bit in a
calculation with SUB or EOR. Setting the S bit on either instruction will still allow
them to be represented alphanumerically. After these instructions are executed,
the contents of the CPSR register is known, and the instructions do not have to be
duplicated anymore.
3.2.2 Registers
When the processor starts executing the alphanumeric shellcode, the contents
of all the registers is unknown. However, in order to do any useful calculations,
the value of at least some registers must be known. In addition, a solution must
be found to set the contents of registers r0 to r2. Without these registers, the
shellcode will not be able to do system calls or execute library functions.
Getting a constant in a register None of the traditional instructions are available
to place a known value in a register, making this a non-trivial problem. The MOV
instruction cannot be used, because it is never alphanumeric. The only data
processing instructions that are available are EOR and SUB, but these instructions
can only be used in conjunction with addressing modes that use immediate values
or involve shifting and rotating. Because the result of a subtraction or exclusive OR
between an unknown value and a known value is still unknown, these instructions
are not useful. Given that these are the only arithmetic instructions that are
supported in alphanumeric code, it is impossible to arithmetically get a known
value into a register.
Fortunately, there is some knowledge about the running code that can be exploited
in order to get a constant value into a register. Even though the exact value
of the program counter, register r15, is unknown, it will always point to the
executing shellcode. Hence, by using the program counter as an operand for the
LDRB instruction, one of the bytes of the shellcode can be loaded into a register.
This can be done as follows (non-alphanumeric code on the left, alphanumeric code
on the right):
mov r3 , # . . . subpl r3 , pc , #56
ldrplb r3 , [ r3 , #−48]
pc cannot be used directly in an LDR instruction as this would result in non-
alphanumeric code. So its contents is copied to register r3 by subtracting 56
from pc. The value 56 is chosen to make the instruction alphanumeric. Then,
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register r3 is used in the LDRB instruction to load a known byte from the shellcode
into r3. The immediate offset -48 is used to ensure that the LDRB instruction is
alphanumeric. Once this is done, r3 can be used to load other values into other
registers by subtracting an immediate value.
Loading values in arbitrary registers As explained in Section 3.1.1, it is not
possible to use registers r0 to r2 as the destination registers of arithmetic operations.
There is, however, one operation that can be used to write to the three lowest
registers, without generating non-alphanumeric instructions. The LDM instruction
loads values from the stack into multiple registers. It encodes the list of registers it
needs to write to in the last two bytes of the instruction. If bit n is set, register Rn
is included in the list and data is written to it. In order to get the bytes of the
instruction to become alphanumeric, other registers have to be added to the list.
That is, the following code
mov r0 , r3
mov r1 , r4
mov r2 , r6
has to be transformed as follows to be alphanumeric:
stmpldb r5 , { r3 , r4 , r6 , r8 , r9 , l r }ˆ
rsbpl r3 , r8 , #72
subpl r5 , r5 , r3 , ROR #2
ldmplda r5 ! , { r0 , r1 , r2 , r6 , r9 , l r }
In the example above, the registers r3, r4 and r6 are stored on the stack using the
STM instruction and then read from the stack into registers r0, r1, r2 using the
LDM instruction. In order to make the STM instruction alphanumeric, the dummy
registers r8, r9 and lr are added to the list, which will write them to the stack.
Similarly the LDM instruction adds r6, r9 and lr. This will replace the value of r6
with the value of r8. The caret symbol is also necessary to make the instruction
alphanumerical. This symbol sets a bit that is only used if the processor is executing
in privileged mode. Setting the caret indicated that user mode registers should
be stored instead of privileged mode registers. In unprivileged mode, the bit is
ignored.
The decrement before addressing mode that is used for the STM instruction results
in an invalid bit pattern when used in conjunction with LDM. Hence, we use a
different addressing mode for the STM instruction. This requires, however, that we
modify the starting address slightly for it to work as expected, which we do by
subtracting 4 from the base register r5 using the RSB and SUB instructions above.
Register r8 is assumed to contain the value 56 (for instance, by loading this value
into the register as described in the previous paragraph). The RSB instruction will
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subtract the contents of r8 from the value 72, and store the result, 16, into r3. In
the next instruction, r3 is rotated right by two positions, producing the value 4.
3.2.3 Arithmetic Operations
The ADD instruction is not alphanumeric, so it must be simulated using other
instructions. After generating a negative number by subtracting from our known
value, an addition can be performed by subtracting that negative value from another
register. However, one caveat is that when the SUB instruction is used with two
registers as operands, an additional rotate right (ROR) on the second operand must
be done in order to make the bytes alphanumeric. This effect can be countered
by either rotating the second operand with an immediate value that will result in
a (different) known value, or by rotating the second operand with a register that
contains the value 0. The non-alphanumeric and alphanumeric variations of these
operations are shown below.
mov r7 , #−1
mov r3 , #0
add r5 , r5 , #1
subpl r7 , r3 , #57
subpl r3 , r3 , #56
subpl r5 , r5 , r7 ROR r3
If we assume that register r3 contains the value 56, using the trick explained in
Section 3.2.2, the code above starts by setting register r7 to -1 and sets register r3
to 0. One is added to the value in register r5 by subtracting the value -1 from it
and rotating this value by 0 bits.
Subtract works in a similar fashion except a positive value is used as argument.
mov r7 , #1
mov r3 , #0
sub r5 , r5 , #1
subpl r7 , r3 , #55
subpl r3 , r3 , #56
subpl r5 , r5 , r7 ROR r3
The above examples show the +1 and −1 operations respectively. While these
would be enough to calculate arbitrary values given enough applications, it is
possible to use larger values by setting r7 to a larger positive or negative value.
However, for even larger values it is also possible to set r3 to a nonzero value. For
example, if r3 is set to 20, then the last instruction will not subtract one, but will
instead subtract 4096.
As can be seen from the example above, we can also subtract and add registers to
and from each other (for addition, we of course need to subtract the register from
0 first).
Multiplication and division follow from repeated application of addition and
subtraction.
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3.2.4 Bitwise Operations
This section discusses the different bitwise operations.
Rotating and shifting Instructions on ARM that use the arithmetic addressing
mode, explained in Section 2.1.4, can perform all kinds of shifts and rotations on
the last operand prior to using it in a calculation. However, not all variants can
be used in alphanumeric instructions. In particular, none of the left shift and left
rotate variants can be used. Of course, left shifting can be emulated by multiplying
by a power of 2, and left rotates can be emulated with right rotates.
Exclusive OR The representation of the Exclusive OR (EOR) instruction is
alphanumeric and is thus one of the instructions that can be used in our shellcode.
However the same restrictions apply as for subtract.
Complement By applying an Exclusive OR with the value -1 we can achieve a
NOT operation.
Conjunction and disjunction Conjunction can be emulated as follows: for every
bit of the two registers being conjoined, first shift both registers left2 by 31 minus
the location of the current bit, then shift the results to the right so the current
bit becomes the least significant bit. We can now multiply the registers. We have
now performed an AND over those bits. Shifting the result left by the amount of
bits we shifted right will place the bit in the correct location. We can now add this
result to the register that will contain the final result (this register is initialized to
0 before performing the AND operation). This is a rather complex operation, which
turns out not to be necessary for proving Turing completeness or for implementing
shell-spawning shellcode, but it can be useful if an attacker must perform an AND
operation.
Given this implementation of AND and the previously discussed NOT operation, OR
follows from the application of De Morgan’s law.
3.2.5 Memory Access
Arbitrary values can be read from memory by using the LDR or LDRB instruction
with a register which points 48 bytes further than the memory we wish to access:
2Left shifting is done by multiplying by the correct power of 2, as discussed in Section 3.2.3.
40 FILTER-RESISTANT SHELLCODE
ldrpl r5 , [ r3 , #−48]!
ldrplb r3 , [ r3 , #−48]
The first instruction will load the four bytes stored at memory location r3 minus
48 into r5. The offset calculation is written back into r3 in order to make the
instruction alphanumeric. The second instruction will load the byte pointed to by
r3 minus 48 into r3.
Storing bytes to memory can be done with the STRB instruction:
strplb r5 , [ r3 , #−48]
In the above example, STRB will store the least significant byte of r5 at the memory
location pointed to by r3 minus 48.
The STR instruction cannot be used alphanumerically. An alternative to using
STR is to use the STM instruction, which stores multiple registers to memory. This
instruction stores the full contents of the registers to memory, but it cannot be
used to store a single register to memory, as this would result in non-alphanumeric
code.
Another possibility to store the entire register to memory is to use multiple STRB
instructions and use the shift right capability that was discussed earlier to get each
byte into the correct location
mov r5 , #0
mov r3 , #16
subpl r3 , r5 , r7 , ROR r3
subpl r3 , r5 , r3 , ROR r5
strplb r3 , [ r13 , #−50]
mov r3 , #24
subpl r3 , r5 , r7 , ROR r3
subpl r3 , r5 , r3 , ROR r5
strplb r3 , [ r13 , #−49]
The code above shows how to store the 2 most significant bytes of r73 to r13 minus
49 and r13 minus 50 respectively.
3.2.6 Control Flow
This section discusses unconditional and conditional branches.
3The code is slightly simplified for better readability in that we use MOV, which is not
alphanumeric, to load the values to r3 and r5
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Unconditional branches As discussed in Section 3.1.3, the branch instruction
requires a 24 bit offset from pc as argument, which is shifted two bits to the left
and sign extended to a 32 bit value. The smallest alphanumeric offset that can be
provided to branch corresponds to an offset of 12MB. In the context of shellcode,
this offset is clearly not very useful. Instead, we will use self-modifying code to
rewrite the argument to the branch before reaching this branching instruction.
This is done by calculating each byte of the argument separately and using STRB
with an offset to pc to overwrite the correct instruction. The non-alphanumeric
(left) and alphanumeric (right) variations are shown below.
b l a b e l subpl r3 , pc , #48
subpl r5 , r8 , #56
subpl r7 , r8 , #108
subpl r3 , r3 , r7 , ROR r5
subpl r3 , r3 , r7 , ROR r5
subpl r3 , r3 , r7 , ROR r5
subpl r7 , r8 , #54
strplb r7 , [ r3 , #−48]
. byte 0x30 , 0 x30 , 0 x30 , 0 x90
The above example shows how the argument of a branch instruction can be
overwritten. The branch instruction itself is alphanumeric, and is represented by
byte 0x90 in machine code. In the example, the branch offset consists of three
placeholder bytes with the value 0x30. These will be overwritten by the preceding
instructions.
The code copies pc minus 48 to r3 and sets r5 to 0 (we assume r8 contains 56). It
then sets r7 to -52, subtracts this 3 times from r3. This will result in r3 containing
the value pc plus 108. When we subsequently write the value r7 to r3 minus 48
we will in effect be writing to pc plus 60. Using this technique we can rewrite the
arguments to the branch instruction.
This must be done for every branch in the program before the branch is reached.
However as discussed in section 3.1.4 we cannot simply write self-modifying code
for ARM due to the instruction cache: this cache will prevent the processor from
seeing our modifications. In section 3.2.7 we discuss how we were still able to
flush the cache to allow our self-modifications to be seen by the processor once all
branches have been rewritten.
Conditional branches In order to restrict the different types of instructions that
should be rewritten, compare instructions and the corresponding conditional branch
are replaced with a sequence of two branches that use only the PL and MI condition
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codes. Some additional instructions must be added to simulate the conditional
behavior that is expected.
As an example, imagine we want to execute the following instructions that will
branch to the endinter label if r5 is equal to 0:
cmp r5 , #0
beq end in te r
These two instructions can be rewritten as (r8 contains 56):
subpl r3 , r8 , #52
subpls r3 , r5 , r3 , ROR #2
bpl notnu l l
subpl r5 , r8 , #57
submis r7 , r8 , #56
subpls r5 , r3 , r5 , ROR #2
bpl end in te r
submis r7 , r8 , #56
notnu l l :
By observing whether the processor changes condition state after subtracting and
adding one to the original value, we can deduce whether the original value was
equal to zero or not. If we subtract one, and the state of the processor remains
positive, the value must be greater than zero. If the processor changes state, the
value was either zero or a negative number. By adding one again, and verifying
that the processor state changes to positive again, we can ensure that the original
value was indeed zero.
As with the unconditional branch, the actual branching instruction is not available
in alphanumeric code, so again we must overwrite the actual branch instruction in
the code above.
3.2.7 System Calls
As described in Section 3.1.4, the instruction cache of the ARM processor will
hamper self-modifying code. One way of ensuring that this cache can be bypassed, is
by turning it off programmatically. This can be done by using the alphanumeric MRC
instruction, and specifying the correct operand that turns the cache off. However,
as this instruction is privileged before ARMv6, we will not use this approach in
our shellcode.
Another option is to execute a system call that flushes the cache. This can be
done using the SWI instruction, given the correct operand. The first byte of a SWI
instruction encodes the condition code and the opcode of the instruction. The
other three bytes encode the number of the system call that needs to be executed.
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Fortunately, the first byte can be made alphanumeric by choosing the MI condition
code for the SWI instruction.
On ARM/Linux, the system call for a cache flush is 0x9F0002. None of these
bytes are alphanumeric and since they are issued as part of an instruction this
could mean that they cannot be rewritten with self-modifying code. However, SWI
generates a software interrupt and to the interrupt handler 0x9F0002 is actually
data. As a result, it will not be read via the instruction cache, so any modifications
made to it prior to the SWI call will be reflected correctly, since these modifications
will have been done via the data cache (any write or read to/from memory goes
via the data cache, only instruction execution goes via the instruction cache).
In non-alphanumeric code, the instruction cache would be flushed with this sequence
of operations:
mov r0 , #0
mov r1 , #−1
mov r2 , #0
swi 0x9F0002
Since these instructions generate a number of non-alphanumeric characters, the
previously mentioned code techniques will have to be applied to make this
alphanumeric (i.e., writing to r0 to r2 via LDM and STM and rewriting the argument
to SWI via self-modifying code). Given that the SWI instruction’s argument is seen
as data, overwriting the argument can be done via self-modification. If we also
overwrite all the branches in the program prior to performing the SWI, then all
self-modified code will now be seen correctly by the processor and our program
can continue.
3.2.8 Thumb Mode
Although the Thumb instruction set is not used in order to prove that alphanumeric
ARM code is Turing complete, it might nevertheless be interesting to know that it
is possible to switch between the two modes in an alphanumeric way. Unlike the
contents of the status register, the attacker typically knows beforehand whether
the processor is in ARM mode or Thumb mode. If the attacker exploits a function
that is running in ARM mode, the shellcode will be also be called in ARM mode.
Likewise, an exploit for Thumb code will cause the shellcode to be started in
Thumb mode.
Entering Thumb mode Changing the processor state from ARM mode to Thumb
mode is done by calling the branch and exchange instruction BX. ARM instructions
are always exactly four bytes and Thumb instructions are exactly two bytes. Hence,
all instructions are aligned on either a two or four byte alignment. Consequently,
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the least-significant bit of a code address will never be set in either mode. It is
this bit that is used to indicate to which mode the processor must switch.
If the least significant bit of a code address is set, the processor will switch to
Thumb mode, clear the bit and jump to the resulting address. If the bit is not set,
the processor will switch to ARM mode. Below is an example that switches the
processor from ARM to Thumb state.
subpl r6 , pc , #−1
bx r6
<Thumb in s t r u c t i o n s>
In ARM mode, pc points to the address of the current instruction plus 8. The
BX instruction is not alphanumeric, so it must be overwritten in order to execute
the correct instruction. The techniques presented in Section 3.2.7 can be used to
accomplish this.
Exiting Thumb mode If the program that is being exploited is running in Thumb
mode when the vulnerability is triggered, the attacker can either choose to continue
with shellcode that uses Thumb instructions, or he can switch to ARM mode. The
SWI instruction is not alphanumeric in Thumb mode, making self-modifying code
impossible with only Thumb instructions. The alternative is to switch to ARM
mode, where system calls can be performed.
bx pc
add r7 , #50
<ARM in s t r u c t i o n s>
Unlike ARM mode, the BX instruction is alphanumeric in Thumb mode. pc points
to the address of the current instruction, plus 4. Since Thumb instructions are 2
bytes long, we must add a dummy instruction after the BX instruction. Also note
that a dummy instruction before BX might be necessary in order to correct the
Thumb alignment to ARM alignment.
3.3 Proving Turing-Completeness
In this section we argue that with our alphanumeric ARM shellcode we are able
to perform all useful computations. We are going to show that the shellcode is
Turing complete. Our argument runs as follows: we take a known Turing-complete
programming language and build an interpreter for this language in alphanumeric
shellcode.
The language of choice is BrainF*ck (BF) [73], which has been proven to be Turing
complete [57]. BF is a very simple language that mimics the behavior of a Turing
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machine. It assumes that it has access to unlimited memory, and that the memory
is initialized to zero at program start. It also has a pointer into this memory, which
we call the memory pointer. The language supports 8 different operations, each
symbolized by a single character. Table 3.3 describes the meaning of each character
that is part of the BF alphabet and gives the equivalent meaning in C (assuming
that p is the memory pointer of type char*).
Table 3.2: The BF language
BF Meaning C equivalent
> increases the memory pointer to point to the next
memory location.
p++;
< decreases the memory pointer to point to the
previous memory location.
p--;
+ increases the value of the memory location that
the memory pointer is pointing to by one.
(*p)++;
- decreases the value of the memory location that
the memory pointer is pointing to by one.
(*p)--;
. write the memory location that the memory
pointer is pointing to stdout.
write(1, p, 1);
, read from stdin and store the value in the memory
location that the pointer is pointing to.
read(0, p, 1);
[ starts a loop if the memory pointed to by the
memory pointer is not 0. If it is 0, execution
continues after the matching ] (the loop operator
allows for nested loops).
while (*p) {
] continue the loop if the memory pointed to by
the memory pointer is not 0, if it is 0, execution
continues after the ].
if (!*p) break; }
We implemented a mapping of BF to alphanumeric shellcode as an interpreter
written in alphanumeric ARM shellcode. The interpreter takes as input any BF
program and simulates the behavior of this program. The details of the interpreter
are discussed below.
Several issues had to be addressed in our implementation.
• Because we wanted the BF program that must be executed to be part of
the interpreter shellcode, we remapped all BF operations to alphanumeric
characters: > ... ] are mapped to the characters J ... C respectively.
• We extended the BF language (since this is a superset of BF, it is still Turing
complete), with a character to do program termination. We use the character
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“B” for this purpose. While this is not necessary to show Turing completeness,
having a termination character simplifies our implementation.
• As with BF we assume that we have unlimited memory, our implementation
provides for an initial memory area of 1024 bytes but this can be increased
as needed.
• The memory required by our interpreter to run the BF program is initialized
to 0 at startup of the interpreter.
3.3.1 Initialization
To support the BF language, we use three areas of memory: one which contains
the code of the BF program (we will refer to this as the BF-code area) that we are
executing, a second which serves as the memory of the program (the BF-memory
area), and a third which we use as a stack to support nested loops (the loop-memory
area). Memory for these areas is assumed to be part of the shellcode and each area
is assumed to be 1024 bytes large.
We store pointers to each of these memory areas in registers r10, r9 and r11
respectively. These pointers are calculated by subtracting from the pc register.
Once these registers are initialized, the contents of BF-memory is initialized to
0. Since it is part of our shellcode, the BF-memory contains only alphanumeric
characters by default. The memory is cleared by looping (using a conditional
branch) over the value of r9 and setting each memory location to 0 until it reaches
the end of the buffer. The memory size can be increased by adding more bytes to
the BF-memory region in the shellcode, and by making minor modifications to the
initialization of the registers r9 to r11.
3.3.2 Parsing
Parsing the BF program is done by taking the current character and executing the
expected behavior. To simplify the transition of the control flow from the code that
is interpreting each BF code character to the actual implementation of the function,
we use a jump table. The implementation of every BF operation is assumed to start
256 bytes from the other. By subtracting ‘A’ from the character we are interpreting
and then subtracting that number multiplied by 256 from the program counter, we
generate the address that contains the start of the implementation of that operation.
To be able to end the program correctly we need the program termination character
that was added to the BF language earlier (“B”). Because the implementation of a
BF operation must be exactly 256 bytes, the actual implementation code is padded
with dummy instructions.
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3.3.3 BF Operations
The first four BF operations: “>”,“<”,“+” and “-” (or “J”, “I”, “H”, “G”) are easily
implemented using the code discussed in Section 3.2. The instructions for “.” and “,”
(“F” and “E”) are system calls to respectively read and write. As was discussed in
Section 3.2.7, we need to rewrite the argument of the SWI instruction to correspond
with the arguments for read and write (0x00900004 and 0x00900003), which can
not be represented alphanumerically.
Loops in BF work in the following way: everything between “[” and “]” is executed
repeatedly until the contents of the memory that the memory pointer is pointing
to is equal to 0 when reaching either character. This scheme allows for nested
loops. To implement these nested loops, we store the current pointer to the BF-code
memory (contained in register r10) in the loop-memory area. Register r11 acts as
a stack pointer into this area. When a new loop is started, r11 will point to the
top of the stack. When we reach “]”, we compare the memory pointed to by the
memory pointer to 0. If the loop continues, a recursive function call is made to the
interpreted function. If the result was in fact 0, then the loop has ended and we
can remove the top value of the loop-memory by modifying the r11 register.
3.3.4 Branches and System Calls
As discussed in Section 3.2.6, we can not use branches directly: the argument
for the branch instruction is a 24 bit offset from PC. Instead of overwriting the
argument, however, we chose to instead calculate the address we would need to
jump to and store the result in a register. We then insert a dummy instruction
that will later be overwritten with the BX <register> instruction. Each possible
branch instruction is fixed up in this way: at the end of a BF operation when we
must jump to the end of the function, for the branches used to implement the loop
instructions, . . .
As discussed in Section 3.2.7, the arguments to system calls also need to be
overwritten. This is also done by our self-modifying code.
All this self-modification is done right after the shellcode has started executing.
Once we have overwritten all necessary memory locations, a cache flush is performed,
which ensures that the new instructions will be read correctly when the processor
reaches them.
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3.4 Related Work
Building regular shellcode for ARM exists for both Linux [45] and Windows [50]. To
facilitate NULL-byte avoidance, self-modification is also discussed in [45]. However,
because only the arguments to SWI are modified, no cache flush is needed in this
case, simplifying the shellcode considerably.
Alphanumeric shellcode exists for the x86 architecture [92]. Due to the variable
length instructions used on this architecture, it is easier to achieve alphanumeric
shellcode because many more instructions can be used compared to ARM
architectures (jumps, for instance, are no problem), and the code is also not
cached. Eller [36] discusses an encoder that will encode instructions as ASCII
characters, that when executed on an Intel processor will decode the original
instructions and execute them.
In Shacham [98] and Buchanan [20], the authors describe how to use the instructions
provided by libc on both Intel and RISC architectures to perform return-into-libc
attacks that are also Turing complete. By returning to a memory location which
performs the desired instruction and subsequently executes a return, attackers can
string together a number of return-into-libc attacks which can execute arbitrary code.
The addresses returned to in that approach, however, may not be alphanumeric,
which can result in problems when confronted with filters that prevent the use of
any type of value.
3.5 Summary
We discussed how an attacker can use purely alphanumeric characters to insert
shellcode into the memory space of an application running on a RISC processor.
Given the fact that all instructions on a 32-bit RISC architecture are 4 bytes large,
this turns out to be a non-trivial task: only 0.34% of the 32 bit words consist
of 4 alphanumeric characters. However, we show that even with these severe
constraints, it is possible to build an interpreter for a Turing complete language,
showing that this alphanumeric shellcode is Turing complete. While the fact that
the alphanumeric shellcode is Turing complete means that any program written in
another Turing complete language can be represented in alphanumeric shellcode,
an attacker may opt to simplify the task of writing alphanumeric shellcode in ARM
by building a stager in alphanumeric shellcode that decodes the real payload, which
can then be written non-alphanumerically.
In [124], we present real-world alphanumeric ARM shellcode that executes a pre-
existing executable, demonstrating the practical applicability of the shellcode.
Using alphanumeric shellcode, an attacker can bypass filters that filter out non-
alphanumeric characters, while still being able to inject code that can perform
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arbitrary operations. It may also help an attacker in evading intrusion detection
systems that try to detect the existence of shellcode in input coming from the
network.

Chapter 4
Code Pointer Masking
A major goal of an attacker is to gain control of the computer that is being attacked.
This can be accomplished by performing a so-called code injection attack. In this
attack, the attacker abuses a bug in an application in such a way that he can
divert the control flow of the application to run binary code that the attacker
injected in the application’s memory space. The most basic code injection attack
is a stack-based buffer overflow, where the attacker modifies the return address
of a function. By making the return address point to code he injected into the
program’s memory as data, he can force the program to execute any instructions
with the privilege level of the program being attacked [4]. Following this classic
attack technique, several other — more advanced — attack techniques have been
developed, including heap-based buffer overflows, indirect pointer overwrites, and
others. All these attacks eventually overwrite a code pointer, i.e. a memory location
that contains an address that the processor will jump to during program execution.
Examples of code pointers are return addresses on the stack and function pointers.
According to the NIST’s National Vulnerability Database [75], 9.86% of the reported
vulnerabilities are buffer overflows, preceded only by SQL injection attacks (16.54%)
and XSS (14.37%). Although buffer overflows represent less than 10% of all attacks,
they make up 17% of the vulnerabilities with a high severity rating.
Code injection attacks are often high-profile, as a number of large software
companies can attest to. Apple has been fighting off hackers of the iPhone since it
has first been exploited with a code injection vulnerability in one of the iPhone’s
libraries1. Google saw the security of its new sandboxed browser Chrome breached2
because of a code injection attack. And a recent attack exploiting a code injection
1CVE-2006-3459, http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-3459
2CVE-2008-6994, http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-6994
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vulnerability in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer3 led to an international row between
Google and the Chinese government. This clearly indicates that even with the
current widely deployed countermeasures, code injection attacks are still a very
important threat.
Code injection attacks are typically the result of memory management bugs in
applications that are written in so-called unsafe languages. Due to the potential
of exploiting this type of bugs and the severity of what an exploit can do, a large
number of countermeasures have been proposed to alleviate or solve these problems.
Section 2.2 introduced the widely deployed countermeasures, and offered a short
overview of other existing countermeasures. They can be roughly categorized
in either highly performant but providing partial protection, or providing more
complete protection at a substantial performance cost.
In this chapter we present a new approach, called Code Pointer Masking (CPM),
for protecting against code injection attacks. CPM is very efficient and provides
protection that is partly overlapping with but also complementary to the protection
provided by existing efficient countermeasures.
By efficiently masking code pointers, CPM constrains the range of addresses that
code pointers can point to. By setting these constraints in such a way that an
attacker can never make the code pointer point to injected code, CPM prevents
the attacker from taking over the computer (under the assumptions listed in
Section 1.5). Contrary to other highly efficient countermeasures, CPM’s security
does not rely on secret data of any kind, and so cannot be bypassed if the attacker
can read memory [62, 111].
CPM has been developed in the context of a bilateral project between the DistriNet
research group and DOCOMO Euro-Labs. The contents of this chapter builds on
the general introduction to the ARM architecture presented in Section 2.1 and the
introduction to code injection attacks presented in Section2.2.
4.1 Design
Existing countermeasures that protect code pointers can be roughly divided into
two classes. The first class of countermeasures makes it hard for an attacker
to change specific code pointers. An example of this class of countermeasures
is Multistack [126]. In the other class, the countermeasures allow an attacker
to modify code pointers, but try to detect these changes before any harm can
happen. Examples of such countermeasures are stack canaries [27, 29], pointer
encryption [28] and CFI [1]. These countermeasures will be further explained in
Section 4.5.
3CVE-2010-0249, http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-0249
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This section introduces the Code Pointer Masking (CPM) countermeasure, located
in a third category of countermeasures. The key idea behind this new class is not
to prevent overwriting code pointers, or detect memory corruptions, but to make
it hard or even impossible for an attacker to do something useful.
4.1.1 Masking the Return Address
The basic design of CPM is explained using an example where an attacker modifies
the return address of a function. The return address is one of the most popular
code pointers that is used in attacks to divert the control flow. Other code pointers
are protected in a similar fashion.
Listing 4.1 shows the sequence of events in a normal function epilogue. First, the
return address is retrieved from the stack and copied into a register. Then, the
processor is instructed to jump to the address in the register. Using for instance a
stack based buffer overflow, the attacker can overwrite the return address on the
stack. Then, when the function executes its epilogue, the program will retrieve
the modified address from the stack, store it into a register, and will jump to an
attacker-controlled location in memory.
Listing 4.1: A normal function epilogue.
[ get re turn address from stack ]
[ jump to t h i s address ]
CPM mitigates this attack by strictly enforcing the correct semantics of code
pointers. That is: code pointers should never point to anything that is not in the
code section of the application. By disallowing the processor to jump to arbitrary
locations in memory, the attacker will not be able to jump to the injected shellcode.
Before an application jumps to a code pointer retrieved from memory, the pointer
is first modified such that it cannot point to a memory location that falls outside
of the code section. This operation is called masking. The events in Listing 4.1 are
enhanced as shown in Listing 4.2.
Listing 4.2: A CPM function epilogue.
[ get re turn address from stack ]
[ apply bitmask on address ]
[ jump to t h i s masked address ]
By applying a mask, CPM will selectively be able to set or unset specific bits in the
return address. Hence, it is an efficient mechanism to limit the range of addresses
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that are possible. Any bitwise operator (e.g. AND, OR, BIC (bit clear — AND
NOT), ...) can be used to apply the mask on the return address. Which operator
should be selected depends on how the layout of the program memory is defined.
On Linux, using an AND or a BIC operator is sufficient.
Even though an application may still have buffer overflow vulnerabilities, it becomes
much harder for the attacker to exploit them in a way that might be useful. If the
attacker is able to modify the return address of the function, he is only able to
jump to existing program code.
Example The following example illustrates address masking for the Linux operating
system. It should be noted that on other operating systems, the countermeasure
may need different masking operations than used here, but the concept remains
the same on any system.
As shown in Figure 4.1, program data, heap and stack are located above the
program code in memory. For illustrative purposes, the program code is assumed
to range from 0x00000000 to 0x0000FFFF, thus stack and heap are located on
memory addresses larger than 0x0000FFFF.
Arguments/Environment
Stack
Unused and
Shared Memory
Heap
Static & Global Data
Program Code
Figure 4.1: Stack, heap and program code memory layout for a Linux application
For each function in the application, the epilogue is changed from fetching the
return address and jumping to it, to fetching the return address, performing an
AND operation with the mask 0x0000FFFF on the return address, and then
jumping to the result. Memory addresses that point to the stack or heap will have
at least one bit of the two most significant bytes set. These bits will be cleared,
however, because of the AND operation. As a result, before the memory address
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reaches the JUMP instruction, it will be properly sanitized to ensure that it can
only point to a location within the code segment.
The goal of CPM is to prevent code injection attacks. By overwriting the return
address with rubbish, an attacker can still make the application crash, but he
will not be able to execute his payload. However, the application will crash in an
unpredictable way. Section 4.4 briefly discusses how CPM could be modified to
detect attacks and abort the application instead of randomly crashing.
4.1.2 Mask Optimization
CPM, as described above, already protects against variations of return-to-libc
attacks or return-oriented programming attacks where the attacker tries to jump
to library code. Libraries are loaded outside of the application code region, thus
returns from functions into library memory are not possible. However, an attacker
is still able to jump to application code, including instructions that call library
functions. This does not give the attacker the full freedom that he would typically
enjoy, because he can only return to code that is present in the application or
library methods that are used by the application. However, this may be enough to
successfully exploit the application.
CPM solves this problem by calculating a specific mask per code pointer. If a
function has only a few callers, these corresponding return addresses likely have
some bits in common. These bits can be incorporated into the mask to make it
more strict than the default mask. In addition, logic is added to the compiler to
move methods around in order to generate better masks. Note that these masks
are not secret. If an attacker knows the values of these masks, the only thing he
can infer is the locations where he can jump to, which will in all likelihood be
useless to him.
By also integrating a reordering phase in the compilation process, the compiler is
able to shift the methods in such a way that the number of return sites that are
allowed by the masks can be further optimized. The evaluation in Section 4.3.2
will show that it is possible to generate very narrow masks.
Example Assume that we have two methods M1 and M2, and that these
methods are the only methods that call a third method M3. Method M3
can return to a location somewhere in M1 or M2. If we know during the
compilation of the application that these return addresses are located at memory
location 0x0B3E (0000101100111110) for method M1 and memory location 0x0A98
(0000101010011000) for method M2, we can compute a more restrictive mask for
method M3. With the mask 0x0BBE (0000101110111110) we would do much better
than with the default mask 0xFFFF (1111111111111111), since the more specific
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mask 0x0BBE lets the method M3 return to M1 or M2, but not to the entire code
memory region.
4.1.3 Masking Function Pointers
So far, we have only focused on the return address stored on the stack. For a more
complete protection, all code pointers should be considered. If the application
computes a code pointer somewhere and then jumps to it, this might lead to
another vulnerability. By somehow influencing the computation, the attacker might
be able to divert control flow. As a result, all computed jumps must be preceded
with a masking operation.
It is very difficult to statically analyze a C program to know beforehand which
potential addresses can be called from some specific function pointer call. CPM
solves this by overestimating the mask it uses. During the compilation of the
program, CPM knows the functions whose addresses are taken, and knows where
all the function pointer calls are located. It changes the masks of the functions that
are called to ensure that they can also return to the different return sites of the
function pointer calls. In addition, the masks that are used to mask the function
pointers are selected in such a way that they allow a jump to the different functions
whose addresses have been taken somewhere in the program. As Section 4.3.1
shows, this has no important impact on the quality of the masks.
A potential issue is that calls of function pointers are typically implemented as a
JUMP <register> instruction. There is a very small chance that if the attacker
is able to overwrite the return address of a function and somehow influence the
contents of this register, that he can put the address of his shellcode in the register
and modify the return address to point to this JUMP <register> instruction. Even
if this jump is preceded by a masking operation, the attacker can skip this operation
by returning to the JUMP instruction directly. Although the chances for such an
attack to work are extremely low (the attacker has to be able to return to the
JUMP instruction, which will in all likelihood be prevented by CPM in the first
place), CPM specifically adds protection to counter this threat.
The solutions to this problem differ from architecture to architecture. CPM can
reserve a register that is used exclusively to perform the masking of code pointers.
This will make sure that the attacker can never influence the contents of this
register. The impact of this solution will differ from processor to processor, because
it increases the register pressure. On architectures with only a small amount
of registers, like the Intel x86 architecture, this solution might not be practical.
However, as the performance evaluation in Section 4.3.1 shows, on the ARM
architecture this is a good solution.
In the x86 prototype, this problem is solved by using segment selectors. The
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masking of the return address is performed in a memory where the standard
segment selector does not have access to. Hence, an attacker will never be able
to jump directly to a CPM function return, because it will try to read the return
address from a memory location that the attacker cannot influence.
4.1.4 Masking the Global Offset Table
A final class of code pointers that deserve special attention are entries in the global
offset table (GOT). The GOT is a table that is used for dynamically locating
function calls in libraries. It contains the addresses of dynamically loaded functions
that are located in libraries.
At program startup, these addresses are initialized to point to a helper method that
loads the required library. After loading the library, the helper method modifies the
addresses in the GOT to point to the library method directly. Hence, the second
time the application tries to call a library function, it will jump immediately to
the library without having to go through the helper method.
Overwriting entries in the GOT by means of indirect pointer overwriting is a
common attack technique. By overwriting addresses in the GOT, an attacker can
redirect the execution flow to his shellcode. When the application unsuspectedly
calls the library function whose address is overwritten, the attacker’s shellcode is
executed instead.
Like the other code pointers, the pointers in the GOT are protected by masking
them before they are used. Since all libraries are loaded into the 0x4NNNNNNN
memory range, all code pointers in the GOT must either be somewhere in this
memory range, or must point to the helper method (which lies in the program code
memory).
4.1.5 Masking Other Code Pointers
CPM protects all code pointers in an application. This section contains the code
pointers that have not been discussed yet, and gives a brief explanation of how
they are protected.
When an application shuts down, it executes a number of so-called destructor
methods. The destructor table is a table that contains pointers to these methods,
making it a potential target for a code injection attack. If an attacker is able to
overwrite one of these pointers, he might redirect it to injected code. This code
will then be run when the program shuts down. CPM protects these pointers by
modifying the routine that reads entries from the destructor table.
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Applications also contain a constructor table. This is very similar to the destructor
table, but runs methods at program startup instead of program shutdown. This
table is not of interest to CPM, because the constructors will have already executed
before an attacker can start attacking the application and the table is not further
used.
The C standard also offers support for long jumps, a feature that is used infrequently.
A programmer can save the current program state into memory, and then later
jump back to this point. Since this memory structure contains the location of
where the processor is executing, it is a potential attack target. CPM protects this
code pointer by adding masking operations to the implementation of the longjmp
method.
4.2 Implementation
The CPM prototypes are implemented in gcc-4.4.0 and binutils-2.20 for Linux on the
ARM and x86 architectures. For GCC, the machine descriptions are changed to emit
the masking operations during the conversion from RTL4 to assembly. The ARM
implementation provides the full CPM protection for return addresses, function
pointers, GOT entries, and the other code pointers. The x86 implementation is a
work in progress and currently only protects the return addresses.
4.2.1 Return Addresses
On Intel x86, the RETURN instruction is used to complete a function epilogue by
popping the return address from the stack and jumping to it. Because the masking
operation must happen between the pop from the stack and the jump, our prototype
cannot use the RETURN instruction. Instead, the code is rewritten to the sequence
of instructions in Listing 4.3. 0xNNNNNNNN represents the function-specific mask
that is used. It is calculated by combining all the addresses where the function can
return to using an OR operation.
Listing 4.3: A CPM function epilogue on x86.
popl %edx
andl $0xNNNNNNNN, %edx
jmp ∗%edx
4RTL or Register Transfer Language is one of the intermediate representations that is used by
GCC during the compilation process.
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Function returns on ARM generally make use of the LDM instruction. LDM, an
acronym for ‘Load Multiple’, is similar to a POP instruction on x86. But instead of
only popping one value from the stack, LDM pops a variable number of values from
the stack into multiple registers. In addition, the ARM architecture also supports
writing directly to the program counter register. Hence, GCC uses a combination
of these two features to produce an optimized epilogue. Listing 4.4 shows what
this epilogue looks like.
Listing 4.4: A function prologue and epilogue on ARM.
stmfd sp ! , {< r e g i s t e r s >, fp , l r }
. . .
ldmfd sp ! , {< r e g i s t e r s >, fp , pc}
The STMFD instruction stores the given list of registers to the address that is pointed
to by the sp register. <registers> is a function-specific list of registers that are
modified during the function call and must be restored afterwards. In addition,
the frame pointer and the link register (that contains the return address) are also
stored on the stack. The exclamation mark after the sp register means that the
address in the register will be updated after the instruction to reflect the new top
of the stack. The ‘FD’ suffix of the instruction denotes in which order the registers
are placed on the stack.
Similarly, the LDMFD instruction loads the original values of the registers back from
the stack, but instead of restoring the lr register, the original value of this register
is copied to pc. This causes the processor to jump to this address, and effectively
returns to the parent function.
Listing 4.5: A CPM function prologue and epilogue on ARM.
stmfd sp ! , {< r e g i s t e r s >, fp , l r }
. . .
ldmfd sp ! , {< r e g i s t e r s >, fp }
ldr r9 , [ sp ] , #4
bic r9 , r9 , #0xNN000000
bic r9 , r9 , #0xNN0000
bic r9 , r9 , #0xNN00
bic pc , r9 , #0xNN
Listing 4.5 shows how CPM rewrites the function epilogue. The LDMFD instruction
is modified to not pop the return address from the stack into pc. Instead, the return
address is popped of the stack by the subsequent LDR instruction into the register
r9. We specifically reserve register r9 to perform all the masking operations of
CPM. This ensures that an attacker will never be able to influence the contents of
the register, as explained in Section 4.1.3.
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Because ARM instructions cannot take 32-bit operands, we must perform the
masking in multiple steps. Every bit-clear (BIC) operation takes an 8-bit operand,
which can be shifted. Hence, four BIC instructions are needed to mask the entire
32-bit address. In the last BIC operation, the result is copied directly into pc,
causing the processor to jump to this address.
The mask of a function is calculated in the same way as on the x86 architecture,
with the exception that it is negated at the end of the calculation. This is necessary
because the ARM implementation does not use the AND operator but the BIC
operator.
Alternative function epilogues that do not use the LDM instruction are protected in
a similar way. Masking is always done by performing four BIC instructions.
On the ARM architecture, the long jumps feature of C is implemented as an STM
and an LDM instructions. The masking is performed in a similar way as explained
here.
4.2.2 Function Pointers
The protection of function pointers is similar to the protection of the return address.
Before jumping to the address stored in a function pointer, it is first masked with
four BIC operations, to ensure the pointer has not been corrupted. Register r9
is also used here to do the masking, which guarantees that an attacker cannot
interfere with the masking, or jump over the masking operations.
The mask is calculated by statically analyzing the program code. In most cases, all
possible function pointers are known at compilation time, and thus a specific mask
can be generated by combining the different addresses using an OR operation. It is
sometimes impossible to know the potential function pointers that might occur at
runtime (for instance, when a library method returns a function pointer). In this
case, the mask must be wide enough to allow for any potential code pointer (i.e.
all function addresses in the program code, and all memory locations in the library
memory region). It should be noted, however, that not a single application in the
SPEC benchmark showed this behavior.
4.2.3 Global Offset Table Entries
As explained in Section 4.1.4, applications use a structure called the global offset
table in order to enable dynamically loading libraries. However, an application
does not interact directly with the GOT. It interacts with a jump table instead,
called the Procedure Linkage Table (PLT). The PLT consists of PLT entries, one
for each library function that is called in the application. A PLT entry is a short
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piece of code that loads the correct address of the library function from the GOT,
and then jumps to it.
Listing 4.6: A PLT entry that does not perform masking.
add ip , pc , #0xNN00000
add ip , ip , #0xNN000
ldr pc , [ ip , #0xNNN] !
Listing 4.6 shows the standard PLT entry that is used by GCC on the ARM
architecture. The address of the GOT entry that contains the address of the library
function is calculated in the ip register. Then, in the last instruction, the address
of the library function is loaded from the GOT into the pc register, causing the
processor to jump to the function.
CPM protects addresses in the GOT by adding masking instructions to the PLT
entries. Listing 4.7 shows the modified PLT entry.
Listing 4.7: A PLT entry that performs masking.
add ip , pc , #0xNN00000
add ip , ip , #0xNN000
ldr r9 , [ ip , #0xNNN] !
cmp r9 , #0x10000
orrge r9 , r9 , #0x40000000
bicge pc , r9 , #0xB0000000
bic r9 , r9 , #0xNN000000
bic r9 , r9 , #0xNN0000
bic r9 , r9 , #0xNN00
bic pc , r9 , #0xNN
The first three instructions are very similar to the original code, with the exception
that the address stored in the GOT is not loaded into pc but in r9 instead. Then,
the value in r9 is compared to the value 0x10000.
If the library has not been loaded yet, the address in the GOT will point to the
helper method that initializes libraries. Since this method is always located on a
memory address below 0x10000, the CMP instruction will modify the status flags
to ‘lower than’. This will force the processor to skip the two following ORRGE and
BICGE instructions, because the suffix ‘GE’ indicates that they should only be
executed if the status flag is ‘greater or equal’. The address in r9 is subsequently
masked by the four BIC instructions, and finally copied into pc.
If the library has been loaded, the address in the GOT will point to a method
loaded in the 0x4NNNNNNN address space. Hence, the CMP instruction will set
the status flag to ‘greater than or equal’, allowing the following ORRGE and BICGE
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instructions to execute. These instructions will make sure that the most-significant
four bits of the address are set to 0x4, making sure that the address will always
point to the memory range that is allocated for libraries. The BICGE instruction
copies the result into pc.
4.2.4 Limitations of the Prototype
In some cases, the CPM prototype cannot calculate the masks without additional
input. The first case is when a function is allowed to return to library code. This
happens when a library method receives a pointer to an application function as
a parameter, and then calls this function. This function will return back to the
library function that calls it.
The prototype compiler solves this by accepting a list of function names where
the masking should not be done. Developers must take exceptional care when
writing code for functions that will not be masked, or any child function. This list
is program-specific and should be maintained by the developer of the application.
In the SPEC benchmark, only one application has one method where masking
should be avoided.
The second scenario is when an application generates code, and then tries to jump
to it. This behavior can be necessary for applications such as just-in-time compilers.
CPM will prevent the application from jumping to the generated code, because
it is located outside the acceptable memory regions. A similar solution could be
used as described in the previous paragraph. None of the applications in the SPEC
benchmark displayed this behavior.
4.3 Evaluation
In this section, we report on the performance of our CPM prototype, and discuss
the security guarantees that CPM provides.
4.3.1 Compatibility, Performance and Memory Overhead
To test the compatibility of our countermeasure and the performance overhead,
we ran the SPEC benchmark [49] with our countermeasure and without. All tests
were run on a single machine (ARMv7 Processor running at 800 MHz, 512 Mb
RAM, running Ubuntu Linux with kernel 2.6.28).
All C programs in the SPEC CPU2000 Integer benchmark were used to perform
these benchmarks. Table 4.1 contains the runtime in seconds when compiled with
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SPEC CPU2000 Integer benchmarks
Program GCC (s) CPM (s) Overhead Mask size (bits)
164.gzip 808 824 +1.98% 10.4
175.vpr 2129 2167 +1.78% 12.3
176.gcc 561 573 +2.13% 13.8
181.mcf 1293 1297 +0.31% 8.3
186.crafty 715 731 +2.24% 13.1
197.parser 1310 1411 +7.71% 10.7
253.perlbmk 809 855 +5.69% 13.2
254.gap 626 635 +1.44% 11.5
256.bzip2 870 893 +2.64% 10.9
300.twolf 2137 2157 +0.94% 12.9
Table 4.1: Benchmark results of the CPM countermeasure on the ARM architecture
the unmodified GCC on the ARM architecture, the runtime when compiled with
the CPM countermeasure, and the percentage of overhead. There are no results
for the Intel x86 prototype, because this is only a partial implementation of CPM.
The results on the x86 architecture are, however, very much in line with the results
on the ARM architecture.
Most applications have a performance hit that is less than a few percent, supporting
our claim that CPM is a highly efficient countermeasure. There are no results
for VORTEX, because it does not work on the ARM architecture. Running this
application with an unmodified version of GCC results in a memory corruption
(and crash).
The memory overhead of CPM is negligible. CPM increases the size of the binary
image of the application slightly, because it adds a few instructions to every function
in the application. CPM also does not allocate or use memory at runtime, resulting
in a memory overhead of practically 0%.
The SPEC benchmark also shows that CPM is highly compatible with existing code.
The programs in the benchmark add up to a total of more than 500,000 lines of C
code. All programs were fully compatible with CPM, with the exception of only
one application where a minor manual intervention was required (see Section 4.2.4).
4.3.2 Security Evaluation
As a first step in the evaluation of CPM, some field tests were performed with
the prototype. Existing applications and libraries that contain vulnerabilities5
5CVE-2006-3459 and CVE-2009-0629
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were compiled with the new countermeasure. CPM did not only stop the existing
attacks, but it also raised the bar to further exploit these applications. However,
even though this gives an indication of some of the qualities of CPM, it is not a
complete security evaluation.
The security evaluation of CPM is split into two parts. In the first part, CPM
is compared to the widely deployed countermeasures. Common attack scenarios
are discussed, and an explanation is given of how CPM protects the application
in each case. The second part of the security evaluation explains which security
guarantees CPM provides, and makes the case for CPM by using the statistics we
have gathered from the benchmarks.
CPM versus Widely Deployed Countermeasures
Table 4.2 shows CPM, compared in terms of security protection to the widely
deployed countermeasures (see Section 2.2.2). The rows in the table represent
the different vulnerabilities that allow code injection attacks, and the columns
represent the different countermeasures.
Each cell in the table contains the different (combinations of) attack techniques (see
Section 2.2.2) that can be used to break the security of the countermeasure(s). The
different techniques that are listed in the table are return-into-libc/return-oriented
programming (RiC), information leakage (IL), and heap spraying (HS). As the
table shows, CPM is the only countermeasure that protects against all different
combinations of common attack techniques. Even the widely deployed combination
of countermeasures can be bypassed with a combination of attack techniques.
Return-into-libc attacks, and the newer but related Return-oriented Programming
attacks [98], are protected against by limiting the amount of return sites that the
attacker can return to. Both attacks rely on the fact that the attacker can jump
to certain interesting points in memory and abuse existing code (either in library
code memory or application code memory). However, the CPM masks will most
likely not give the attacker the freedom he needs to perform a successful attack. In
particular, CPM will not allow returns to library code, and will only allow returns
to a limited part of the application code.
Protection against heap spraying is easy for CPM: the masks will never allow an
attacker to jump to the heap (or any other data structure, such as the stack). This
makes heap spraying attacks by definition a non-issue for CPM.
CPM can also not leak information, because it uses no secret information. The
masks that are calculated by the compiler are not secret. Even if an attacker knows
the values of each individual mask (which he can, by simply compiling the same
source code with the same CPM compiler), this will not aid him in circumventing
the CPM masking process.
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Like many other compiler-based countermeasures, all libraries that an application
uses must also be compiled with CPM. Otherwise, vulnerabilities in these libraries
may still be exploited. However, CPM is fully compatible with unprotected libraries,
thus providing support for linking with code for which the source may not be
available.
CPM was designed to provide protection against the class of code injection attacks.
This does not, however, exclude the other classes of attacks on C programs. In
particular, data-only attacks [40], where an attacker overwrites only application
data and no code pointers, are not protected against by CPM.
CPM Security Properties
The design of CPM depends on three facts that determine the security of the
countermeasure.
CPM masks all code pointers. Code pointers that are not masked are still
potential attack targets. For the ARM prototype, we mask all the different code
pointers that are described in related papers. In addition, we looked at all the code
that GCC uses to emit jumps, and verified whether it should be a target for CPM
masking.
Masking is non-bypassable. All the masking instructions CPM emits are
located in read-only program code. This guarantees that an attacker can never
modify the instructions themselves. In addition, the attacker will not be able to
skip the masking process. On the ARM architecture, we ensure this by reserving
register r9 and using this register to perform all the masking operations and the
computed jumps.
The masks are narrow. How narrow the masks can be made differs from
application to application and function to function. Functions with few callers will
typically generate more narrow masks than functions with a lot of callers. The
assumption that most functions have only a few callers is acknowledged by the
statistics. In the applications of the SPEC benchmark, 27% of the functions had
just one caller, and 55% of the functions had three callers or less. Around 1.20% of
the functions had 20 or more callers. These functions are typically library functions
such as memcpy, strncpy, . . . To improve the masks, the compiler shuffles functions
around and sprinkles a small amount of padding in-between the functions. This
is to ensure that return addresses contain as many 0-bits as possible. With this
technique, we can reduce the number of bits that are set to one in the different
function-specific masks. Without CPM, an attacker can jump to any address in
the memory (232 possibilities). Using the techniques described here, the average
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number of bits per mask for the applications in the SPEC benchmark can be
brought down to less than 13 bits. This means that by using CPM for these
applications, the average function is limited to returning to less than 0.0002% of
the memory range of an application.
It is interesting to compare CPM to the Control-Flow Integrity (CFI, [1])
countermeasure. CFI determines a program’s control flow graph beforehand and
ensures that the program adheres to it. It does this by assigning a unique ID to
each possible control flow destination of a control flow transfer. Before transferring
control flow to such a destination, the ID of the destination is compared to the
expected ID, and if they are equal, the program proceeds as normal. What makes
CFI so interesting, is that it has been formally proven correct. Hence, under the
assumptions made by the authors, an attacker will never be able to divert the
control flow of an application that is protected with CFI.
If the masks can be made so precise that they only allow the correct return sites,
an application protected with CPM will never be able to divert from the intended
control flow. In this case, CPM offers the exact same guarantees that CFI offers.
However, in practice, the masks will not be perfect. Hence, CPM can be seen as
an efficient approximation of CFI.
The strength of protection that CPM offers against diversion of control flow depends
on the precision of the masks. An attacker can still jump to any location allowed
by the mask, and for some applications this might still allow interesting attacks.
As such, CPM offers fewer guarantees than CFI. However, given the fact that
the masks can be optimized, it is extremely unlikely that attackers will be able
to exploit the small amount of room they have to maneuver. CPM also offers
a performance that is up to 20x faster than CFI and —unlike CFI— supports
dynamically linked code.
4.4 Discussion and Ongoing Work
CPM overlaps in part with other countermeasures, but also protects against attacks
that are not covered. Vice versa, there are some attacks that might work on
CPM (i.e. attacks that do not involve code injection, such as data-only attacks),
which might not work with other countermeasures. Hence, CPM is complementary
to existing security measures, and in particular can be combined with popular
countermeasures such as stack canaries and ASLR. Adding CPM to the mix of
existing protections significantly raises the bar for attackers wishing to perform a
code injection attack. One particular advantage of CPM is that it is not vulnerable
to a combination of different attack techniques, unlike the current combination of
widely deployed countermeasures.
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When an attacker overwrites a code pointer somewhere, CPM does not detect
this modification. Instead it will mask the code pointer and jump to the sanitized
address. An attacker could still crash the application by writing rubbish in the
code pointer. The processor would jump to the masked rubbish address, and
will very likely crash at some point. But most importantly, the attacker will not
be able to execute his payload. CPM could be modified to detect any changes
to the code pointer, and abort the application in that case. This functionality
can be implemented in 7 ARM instructions (instead of 4 instructions), but does
temporarily require a second register for the calculations.
A promising direction of future work is processor-specific enhancements. In
particular, on the ARM processor, the conditional execution feature could be
used to further narrow down the destination addresses that an attacker can use to
return to. Conditional execution allows almost every instruction to be executed
conditionally, depending on certain status bits. If these status bits are flipped
when a return from a function occurs, and flipped again at the different (known)
return sites in the application, the attacker is forced to jump to one of these return
addresses, or else he will land on an instruction that will not be executed by the
processor.
4.5 Related Work
Many countermeasures have been designed to protect against code injection attacks.
In this section, we briefly highlight the differences between our approach and other
approaches that protect programs against attacks on memory error vulnerabilities.
Bounds checkers. Bounds checking [9, 53, 55, 61, 79, 84, 108] is a better
solution to buffer overflows, however when implemented for C, it has a severe
impact on performance and may cause existing code to become incompatible with
bounds checked code. Recent bounds checkers [2, 125] have improved performance
somewhat, but still do not protect against dangling pointer vulnerabilities, format
string vulnerabilities, and others.
Safe languages. Safe languages are languages where it is generally not possible
for any known code injection vulnerability to exist as the language constructs
prevent them from occurring. A number of safe languages are available that will
prevent these kinds of implementation vulnerabilities entirely. There are safe
languages [52, 58, 60, 77] that remain as close to C or C++ as possible, and are
generally referred to as safe dialects of C. While some safe languages [26, 121]
try to stay compatible with existing C programs, use of these languages may not
always be practical for existing applications.
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Probabilistic countermeasures. Many countermeasures make use of random-
ness when protecting against attacks. Many different approaches exist when using
randomness for protection. Canary-based countermeasures [29, 42, 59, 93] use a
secret random number that is stored before an important memory location: if the
random number has changed after some operations have been performed, then an
attack has been detected. Memory-obfuscation countermeasures [14, 28] encrypt
(usually with XOR) important memory locations or other information using random
numbers. Memory layout randomizers [13, 15, 114, 120] randomize the layout
of memory: by loading the stack and heap at random addresses and by placing
random gaps between objects. Instruction set randomizers [10, 54] encrypt the
instructions while in memory and will decrypt them before execution.
While these approaches are often efficient, they rely on keeping memory locations
secret. However, programs that contain buffer overflows could also contain “buffer
overreads” (e.g. a string which is copied via strncpy but not explicitly null-
terminated could leak information) [111] or other vulnerabilities like format string
vulnerabilities, which allow attackers to print out memory locations. Such memory
leaking vulnerabilities could allow attackers to bypass this type of countermeasure.
Separation and replication of information. Countermeasures that rely on
separation or replication of information will try to replicate valuable control-flow
information or will separate this information from regular data [23]. This makes
it harder for an attacker to overwrite this information using an overflow. Some
countermeasures will simply copy the return address from the stack to a separate
stack and will compare it to or replace the return addresses on the regular stack
before returning from a function [23]. These countermeasures can be bypassed
using indirect pointer overwriting where an attacker overwrites a different memory
location instead of the return address by using a pointer on the stack. More
advanced techniques try to separate all control-flow data (like return addresses
and pointers) from regular data [126], making it harder for an attacker to use an
overflow to overwrite this type of data.
While these techniques can efficiently protect against buffer overflows that try to
overwrite control-flow information, they do not protect against attacks where an
attacker controls an integer that is used as an offset from a pointer.
Another widely deployed countermeasure distinguishes between memory that
contains code and memory that contains data. Data memory is marked as non-
executable [114]. This simple countermeasure is effective against direct code
injection attacks (i.e. attacks where the attacker injects code as data), but provides
no protection against indirect code injection attacks such as return-to-libc attacks.
CPM can provide protection against both direct and indirect code injection.
Software Fault Isolation. Software Fault Isolation (SFI) [68, 118] was not
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developed as a countermeasure against code injection attacks in C, but it does
have some similarities with CPM. In SFI, data addresses are masked to ensure that
untrusted code cannot (accidentally) modify parts of memory. CPM on the other
hand masks code addresses to ensure that control flow can not jump to parts of
memory.
Execution monitors. Some existing countermeasures monitor the execution of a
program and prevent transferring control-flow which could be unsafe.
Program shepherding [56] is a technique that monitors the execution of a program
and will disallow control-flow transfers6 that are not considered safe. An example
of a use for shepherding is to enforce return instructions to only return to the
instruction after the call site. The proposed implementation of this countermeasure
is done using a runtime binary interpreter. As a result, the performance impact of
this countermeasure is significant for some programs, but acceptable for others.
Control-flow integrity, as discussed in Section 4.3.2, is also a countermeasure that
is classified as an execution monitor.
4.6 Summary
We introduced Code Pointer Masking (CPM), an efficient mechanism to strongly
mitigate the risk of code injection attacks in C programs. By masking code pointers
before they are used, CPM imposes restrictions on these pointers that render them
useless to attackers. CPM does not protect applications from data-only attacks,
and, although the chances are very slim, it might still allow code injection attacks
if the masks are not narrow enough.
CPM offers an excellent performance/security trade-off. It severely limits the risk
of code injection attacks, at only a very small performance cost. It seems to be
well-suited for handheld devices with slow processors and little memory, and can
be combined with other countermeasures in a complementary way.
6Such a control flow transfer occurs when e.g., a call or ret instruction is executed.
Chapter 5
Security-by-Contract
One feature that modern security architectures, as discussed in Section 2.3, are
still lacking is expressivity. The application either has a permission to perform an
action, or does not have the permission. However, this means that users cannot
express a desire to give an application permission to use a specific resource, as long
as it is not abused. For instance, a user might want to give permission to a game
to send short messages (if the game communicates via these messages with other
players), but this does not mean that the user wants to give the game the ability
to send an unbounded amount of messages to any phone number.
In addition, doing permission checks might be relatively cheap, but they are not
free. An additional optimization would be to skip the permission check if the
system could somehow verify beforehand that the application will never break the
constraints that the user wants to impose.
This chapter describes the notion of security-by-contract (SxC, [35]). The SxC
paradigm has been worked out in the European FP6 project Security of Software
and Services for Mobile Systems (S3MS) by a consortium of five academic and
seven industrial partners, under the supervision of Fabio Massacci. SxC supports
a number of different technologies that verify whether applications adhere to a
predefined security policy, and enforces this policy when no guarantees can be
given about the program’s behavior with respect to the policy. When a malicious
application tries to access one of these restricted resources, the SxC framework will
prevent it from doing so, under the assumptions specified in Section 1.5.
We then present our implementation and evaluation of the SxC paradigm on
the Microsoft .NET Compact Framework. The different on-device and off-device
components are discussed, together with the implementation strategy we used to
build the framework. A number of practical implementation issues are highlighted
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and discussed. The implementation is evaluated, and it is shown that our
implementation performance characteristics are very good. The implementation
has a similar granularity as the Android system in terms of interception points, but
it allows for much more expressive policies to be written. In addition, there are
mechanisms in place to remove redundant policy checks, speeding up the overall
performance of the system.
5.1 General Overview
This section introduces the different concepts of Security-by-Contract, as worked
out by the different partners in the S3MS consortium. All this work happened
before the author of this PhD thesis was involved in the project.
Security-by-Contract is based on the premise that applications should only be
trusted if it can be proven that they will not harm the system. In order to support
such a system, a good description must be developed that clearly and unambiguously
defines what is understood by ‘harming the system’, called a system policy. In
addition, one or more mechanisms must be developed to somehow prove or enforce
that the application will adhere to such a system policy. These mechanisms are
called enforcement technologies, because they enforce that the application will
never break the policy.
5.1.1 Policies and Contracts
Loosely speaking, a system policy is a set of rules to which an application must
comply. These rules typically limit the access of an application to a specific part of
the system API. For instance, there could be a set of rules to prohibit applications
from accessing the network or to limit the access to the file system. These accesses
are also called security-related events (SREs). One could think of a policy as an
upper-bound description of what applications are allowed to do. System policies
are defined by the owner of a mobile device.
Application contracts are very similar, but instead of defining the upper-bound of
what an application can do, it describes the upper-bound of what the application
will do. It is the ‘worst case’ scenario of security-related behavior of an application.
The contract is typically designed by the application developer and is shipped
together with the application as metadata.
To express the different system policies and application contracts, some kind of
descriptive language is needed. The S3MS consortium defined two different policy
languages, one that represents security automata by means of an explicit declaration
of the security state and guarded commands that operate on this state, and another
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one that is a variant of a temporal logic. Both languages extend history-based
access control by introducing the notion of scopes. A scope specifies whether the
policy applies to (1) a single run of each application, (2) saves information between
multiple runs of the same application or (3) gathers events from the entire system.
Even though they are called ‘policy languages’, these languages can also be used
to specify application contracts.
CONSPEC
In the CONSPEC policy language [3], rules can be described on so-called security-
related events (SRE). In the context of the S3MS implementations, these SREs
correspond to security-sensitive calls from an application into its base class library.
Examples of these calls are methods that open files, network connections or give
access to sensitive data.
Listing 5.1: A CONSPEC policy, limiting the network data transfer
SCOPE Se s s i on
SECURITY STATE
i n t bytesSent = 0 ;
BEFORE i n t sent = System . Net . Sockets . Socket . Send
( byte [ ] array )
PERFORM
array == nu l l −> { }
bytesSent + array . Length <= 1000 −> { }
AFTER i n t sent = System . Net . Sockets . Socket . Send
( byte [ ] array )
PERFORM
t rue −> { bytesSent += sent ; }
Listing 5.1 contains a small example policy written in CONSPEC. The first line
in the CONSPEC source sets the scope of the contract or policy. The scope
defines whether the CONSPEC rules act on a single application instance, on all the
instances of a specific application, or on every application in the system. A session
scope acts on single application instances. Hence, the example of Figure 5.1 that
imposes a 1000-byte network limit means that every instance of an application
can send at most 1000 bytes. A second type of scope is a global scope. Rules in
such a global scope act on all applications together. If we modify the example in
Figure 5.1 to use a global scope instead of a session scope, the meaning of the rules
would become “all applications on the system combined may send up to 1000 bytes
over the network”. Finally, a third multi-session scope is supported. This scope
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fits in between the global and session scopes. A multi-session scope defines rules
for all instances of the same application.
The scope declaration is followed by the security state. This security state contains
a definition of all the variables that will be used to store the CONSPEC state. In
the example of Figure 5.1, this will be a variable that holds the number of bytes
that have already been sent. The ability for a CONSPEC policy to keep track
of state is a critical difference between the SxC system and traditional security
systems such as code access security. Where CAS can only either allow or deny a
call to a specific library function, the SxC system can allow such a call as long as a
particular precondition is met.
The security state is followed by one or more clauses. Each clause represents a rule
on a security-relevant event. These rules can be evaluated before the SRE is called,
after the SRE is called, or when an exception occurs. A clause definition consists
of the ’BEFORE’, ’AFTER’ or ’EXCEPTIONAL’ keyword to indicate when the
rule should be evaluated, the signature of the SRE on which the rule is defined,
and a list of guard/update blocks. The method signature corresponds largely to
something a C# or Java programmer would expect.
As the name implies, a guard/update block consists of first a guard and then an
update block. The guard is a boolean expression that is evaluated when a rule is
being processed. If the guard evaluates to true, the corresponding update block is
executed. All state changes that should occur can be incorporated in this update
block. When a guard evaluates to true, the evaluation of the following guards
(and consequently the potential execution of their corresponding update blocks) is
skipped.
If none of the guards evaluates to true, this means the policy does not allow the
SRE. For example, in Figure 5.1, if the current state of the policy has bytesSent
= 950, then a call to the Send method with an array of length 55 will fail all the
guards.
2D-LTL
The 2D-LTL policy language [32, 67] is an alternative for CONSPEC that is
a temporal logic language based on a bi-dimensional model of execution. One
dimension is a sequence of states of execution inside each run (session) of the
application, and another one is formed by the global sequence of sessions themselves
ordered by their start time.
The states of all the different applications are linked in two ways. For a single
application, all its consecutive application states are linked to each other. This
link is called the session of that application. In addition, all application sessions
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are linked by a frontier. A frontier links all the latest active states of the different
applications.
To reason about this bi-dimensional model, two types of temporal operators are
applied: local and global ones. Local operators apply to the sequence of states
inside the session, for instance, the “previously local” operator (YL) refers to the
previous state in the same session, while “previously global” (YG) points to the
final state of the previous session.
5.1.2 Enforcement Technologies
A number of different enforcement technologies can be used to make sure that an
application complies with a device policy. This section gives an overview of the
most common enforcement technologies.
Code Signing
One way to enforce a policy is to have a trusted third party certify that an
application complies to a given policy. This trusted party would have a different
public/private key pair for every different policy it certifies. An application
developer would then send his application to this trusted party for compliance
certification with one of the trusted party’s policies. When the application is found
to comply with the policy, it gets signed with the key corresponding to that policy.
The signature can be contained in the application metadata, or can be embedded
in the executable itself (using a mechanism such as ‘Authenticode’).
Notice the subtle difference between the meaning of the digital signature in the SxC
system and in the standard Windows CE security architecture. Both systems make
use of the exact same mechanism to verify the signature on an application, but
on the SxC system, the signature tells more about the application than simply its
origin. A signature in the SxC system certifies that the application will not violate
a specific policy, whereas a signature in the Windows CE security architecture
gives no precisely specified guarantees.
The upside of using this enforcement technology is that it is relatively simple to
implement and use. However, third party certification can be costly, and requires
trust in the certifying party.
Policy Matching
The operation of matching the application’s claim with the platform policy is
solved through language inclusion [24]. The contract and the policy are interpreted
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as automata accepting sequences of SREs. Given two such automata AutC
(representing the contract) and AutP (representing the policy), we have a match
when the language accepted by AutC (i.e. the execution traces of the application)
is a subset of the language accepted by AutP (i.e. the acceptable traces for the
policy). For interesting classes of policies, the problem of language inclusion is
decidable.
Proof-carrying Code
An alternative way to enforce a security policy is to statically verify that an
application does not violate this policy. On the one hand, static verification has
the benefit that there is no overhead at runtime. On the other hand, it often needs
guidance from a developer (e.g. by means of annotations) and the techniques for
performing the static verification (such as theorem proving) can be too heavy for
mobile devices. Therefore, with proof-carrying code [76], the static verification
produces a proof that the application satisfies a policy. In this way, the verification
can be done by the developer, or by an expert in the field. The application is
distributed together with the proof. Before allowing the execution of an application,
a proof-checker verifies that the proof is correct for the application. Because proof-
checking is usually much more efficient than making the proof, this step becomes
feasible on mobile devices.
Inlining
A final enforcement technology is policy inlining. During the inlining process, the
SxC system goes through the application code and looks for calls to SREs. When
such a call is found, the system inserts calls to a monitoring component before and
after the SRE. This monitoring component is a programmatic representation of
the policy. It keeps track of the policy state and intervenes when an application is
about to break the policy. After the inlining process, the application complies with
a contract that is equivalent to the system policy.
The biggest advantage of this technique is that it can be used on applications that
are deployed without a contract. It can be used as a fall-back mechanism when
the other approaches fail and it can also ensure backwards compatibility. So, even
in the case of contract-less applications, the SxC framework can offer guarantees
that the application will not violate the system policy. A disadvantage is that the
application is modified during the inlining process, which might lead to subtle bugs.
Also, the monitoring of the SREs comes with a performance overhead.
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5.1.3 Developing SxC Applications
To take full advantage of this new paradigm, applications have to be developed
with SxC in mind. This means that some changes occur in the typical Develop-
Deploy-Run application life cycle. Figure 5.1 shows an updated version of the
application development life cycle.
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Figure 5.1: The application development life cycle
The first step to develop an SxC compliant application, is to create a contract
to which the application will adhere. Remember that the contract represents the
security-related behavior of an application and specifies the upper-bound of calls
made to SREs. Designing a contract requires intimate knowledge of the inner
workings of the application, so it is typically done by a (lead-)developer or technical
analyst. Some mobile phone operators, companies or other authorities may choose
to publish contract templates that can then be used as a basis for new application
contracts. Once the initial version of the contract has been specified, the application
development can begin. During the development, the contract can be revised and
changed when needed.
After the application development, the contract must somehow be linked to the
application code in a tamper-proof way. One straightforward method to do this,
is by having a trusted third party inspect the application source code and the
contract. If they can guarantee that the application will not violate the contract,
they sign a combined hash of the application and the contract. Another way to
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link the contract and the code, is by generating a formal, verifiable proof that the
application complies with the contract, and adding it to the application metadata
container. When this step is completed, the application is ready to be deployed.
The application is distributed together with its contract and optionally other
metadata such as a digital signature from a third party or a proof.
When the program is deployed on a mobile device, the SxC framework checks
whether the application contract is compatible with the device policy. It uses one
of the different enforcement technologies, depending on the available metadata.
For instance, if the application comes with a contract, the SxC framework may
choose to use the matching enforcement technology [16]. If the application ships
with a proof, the SxC framework may choose to try and prove compliance instead.
What happens is that the SxC framework checks whether the security behavior
described in the contract is a subset of the security behavior allowed by the policy.
If it is, the application is allowed to run as-is. If the contract is not a subset of the
policy, the application is treated as an application without a contract.
Backwards Compatibility Support
The scenario in Section 5.1.3 showed how an application with SxC metadata would
be produced and deployed to a mobile device. There is however an important need
to also support the deployment of applications that are not developed with SxC in
mind. This backwards compatibility is a make-or-break feature for the system.
When an application without a contract arrives on the mobile device, there is
no possibility to check for policy compliance through matching. No metadata is
associated with the application that can prove that it does not break the system
policy. A solution for this problem is to enforce the system policy through runtime
checking.
One example of a runtime policy enforcement technology is inlining. During the
inlining process, the application is modified to intercept and monitor all the calls
to SREs. When the monitor notices that the application is about to break the
policy, the call to the SRE that causes the policy to be broken is canceled.
The strength of runtime checking is that it can be used to integrate non-SxC aware
applications into the SxC process. A result of having this component in the SxC
architecture is that it is usable as is, without having to update a huge amount of
existing mobile applications.
Inlining can also be used when an existing application is made SxC-aware. It can
sometimes be difficult to compose a contract for an application that may have been
written years ago by a number of different developers. Instead of investing a lot of
time (and money) into finding out which rules apply to the legacy application, an
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inlining-based alternative could be a solution. The key idea is to use an inlining
technique as described in Section 5.1.2. However, instead of inlining the application
when it is loaded, the application is inlined by the developer. After being inlined,
the application can be certified by a trusted third party.
There are a number of benefits of this approach, compared to on-device inlining. A
first advantage is that the parts of the contract that can be manually verified by
the trusted third party do not have to be inlined into the application. For instance,
imagine that an existing application should comply with the policy “An application
cannot access the network, and cannot write more than 1000 bytes to the hard
disk.” A third party can easily verify whether the application will break the first
part of the policy by inspecting the program code. If the application contains no
network-related code, it will not break this part of the policy. The second part of
the policy may be harder to verify if the application does contain some file-related
code but if it is unclear how many bytes are actually written to the hard disk.
In this case, the developer could inline the application with a monitor that only
enforces the second part of the policy, but the application will nevertheless be
certified for the full policy.
Inlining large applications on a mobile device can be time consuming. Going through
the inlining process before deploying the application eliminates this problem. It
speeds up the application loading process, which is a second advantage.
A final advantage is that the developer can do a quality assurance check on the
inlined application. This is useful to weed out subtle bugs and to ensure that the
inlined application meets the expected quality standard of the developer.
5.2 S3MS.NET
This section presents an implementation of the Security-by-Contract paradigm on
the .NET Compact Framework for Windows Mobile [31, 95]. All work presented in
this section has been designed and implemented by the author of this PhD thesis,
unless mentioned otherwise. An initial high-level architectural overview of the
system was outlined by Lieven Desmet.
The S3MS.NET Framework can be divided into three parts. The first part is
installed on a desktop computer, and is used to create and manage policies and
the corresponding metadata. It is also used to deploy the S3MS.NET Framework
and selected policies to mobile devices.
The second part lives on the mobile device. It takes care of verifying applications
that are installed, and optionally modifies the original code to ensure that the
application adheres to the system policy.
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The third part also lives on the mobile device, and takes care of the runtime
monitoring. If an application cannot prove that it will never break the policy, its
security-relevant behavior is tracked by these components.
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Figure 5.2: High-level architecture overview
Figure 5.2 shows a high-level architectural overview of the entire SxC system. Each
of the three dotted lines corresponds to one of the three parts mentioned above.
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Some components in the architecture are shared between different parts.
5.2.1 Policy Management and Distribution
System policies can be written by anyone, but in practice it can be expected that
only a few people will actually write policies. Writing policies requires technical
skills that are beyond those of most users of mobile devices. It can be anticipated
that large companies or mobile phone operators will write policies centrally by
their technical staff, and then distribute them to their employees’ or customers’
mobile devices. Policy writers can use the Policy Manager tool to write and edit
policies, to prepare the policy for deployment, and to deploy it to a mobile device.
Preparing the policy for deployment means that the policy is converted from a
textual policy to different formats that can easily be used by the on-device SxC
framework. Multiple formats — also called policy representations — for one policy
are possible, depending on which enforcement technologies the policy writer would
like to support. Different enforcement technologies require different formats. For
instance, if the policy has to support matching, a graph representation of the
policy must be deployed to the mobile device. Likewise, if the policy writer wants
to support inlining, an executable version of the policy must be generated. A
collection of one or more policy representations is called a policy package.
The S3MS.NET implementation ships with a module to support the CONSPEC
policy language, and a module, developed by Katsiaryna Naliuka and Fabio
Massacci, to support the 2D-LTL policy language. The implementation also
supports the code signing, matching and inlining enforcement technologies. It is
built with a pluggable architecture to ensure that it can be extended further. For
example, to add a new enforcement technology, a developer only has to build one
class that implements the IPolicyCompiler class and register that class in the
system. Figure 5.3 shows how textual representations of policies are compiled into
different policy representations.
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Figure 5.3: Compilation of a policy package
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When the policy is ready, and the different policy representations are generated,
a policy package is created that can be deployed to a mobile device. The Policy
Manager sends the policy package to the Persistent Policy Store. This store is a
container for all the policies that have been deployed on the device. Policies are
saved on secure data storage, and can only be read by the Persistent Policy Store
manager. The Secure Storage Service prohibits all access to the policies to other
applications. If the device is equipped with a trusted platform module (TPM), this
prohibition is enforced by the hardware.
5.2.2 Application Deployment and Loading
Applications that are deployed to a device can either be aware of the SxC framework
or not. If an application is SxC-aware, it can be deployed with extra metadata
that can be used by the SxC framework. Examples of such metadata are: a proof
that the application complies with a specific policy, a digital signature of a trusted
third party, or other data that is required for some policy enforcement technology.
When the Application Loader receives a request to execute an application, it sends
the application to the Application Deployer. The deployer will first check whether
the application was already verified before. In the architectural model, this is
achieved by checking whether the application is present in the Certified Application
Database. However, this database is a pure conceptual component. In the actual
.NET implementation, the deployer checks whether the application is signed with a
key that is managed by the SxC platform on the device. If an application is signed
with this key, it has been processed before and it is considered to be compliant.
A non-compliant application is sent to the Compliance Engine. The purpose of this
engine is to verify that the application adheres to the system policy, by trying every
supported verification or enforcement method. These methods are represented
by the different Compliance Modules. As soon as one of the compliance modules
returns a result that indicates that the application conforms with the system policy,
the compliance engine signs the application with the SxC key and executes the
program. During this verification process, the actual contents of the executable
may be changed. This is for instance the case with inlining. Figure 5.4 contains a
graphical representation of this process.
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Figure 5.4: Verifying application/policy compliance
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At deployment time of the policy, the policy writer can choose which policy
enforcement mechanisms will be supported by the policy. Three enforcement
mechanisms have been implemented in our prototype.
The first supported mechanism is the use of digital signatures set by a third party
that certify compliance. This trusted party has a different public/private key
pair for every different policy it certifies. If a mobile device administrator wishes
to support a policy of this trusted third party, he configures a digital signature
compliance module that is initialized with the public key that corresponds to this
policy. When a signed application arrives on the device, this compliance module
will check the signature against the public key of this third party. If the signature
is valid, the application is allowed to run.
The second supported mechanism is matching, developed by Katsiaryna Naliuka
and Fabio Massacci. At deployment time the target platform checks that the
application security claims stated in the contract match with the platform policy.
The matching procedure takes as input the application’s contract and the mobile
platform’s policy in a suitable formal representation and then starts a depth first
search procedure over the initial state. When a suspect state is reached we have
two cases. First, when a suspect state contains an error state of the complemented
policy then we report a security policy violation without further ado. Second, when
a suspect state does not contain an error state of the complemented policy we start
a new depth first search from the suspect state to determine whether it is in a cycle,
i.e. it is reachable from itself. If it is we report an availability violation [34, 66].
The third supported enforcement mechanism is inlining for runtime monitoring
[11, 39, 41, 48, 115], which is joint work between Dries Vanoverberghe and the
author of this thesis. When an application arrives on a mobile device, and none of
the compliance modules succeeds in verifying that the application does not violate
the policy, the application is sent to the inlining module. The inlining module is also
a compliance module, but it is always the last compliance module in the list. This
is because the inlining process will never fail, but it does have the disadvantage that
it imposes a runtime overhead, something that other enforcement techniques do not
have. The bytecode of the application — in .NET, this is called the Intermediate
Language (IL) code — is scanned for calls to security-relevant methods. Every call
that is found is modified in such a way that before calling the method a call to a
binary representation of the policy is made. The modified application can then be
considered safe, because all calls to security-relevant functions will be intercepted
and processed at runtime.
5.2.3 Execution Monitoring and Runtime Enforcement
The runtime enforcement scenario only comes into play when an application has
been inlined. Other enforcement technologies are not active during the execution of
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the program, because they can guarantee that the application will always comply
with the policy before ever running the application. Runtime enforcement takes
another approach, and lets applications execute without first formally proving
(using either a mathematical proof, or a trust-based proof) that it will not violate
the system policy. Instead, the application is instrumented with a monitoring
library that can enforce the policy while the application is running.
The centerpiece of the execution monitoring implementation is the monitoring
library — also called the Policy Decision Point (PDP). This is the component
where the policy logic is located. It interprets the current state and the requested
action, and makes a decision to either allow or disallow the action. Calls from
the application are received by the Execution Monitor and passed to the PDP.
The PDP then requests the current state from the Policy State Service and may
optionally request a number of system-specific settings from the System Information
Service. The PDP can then execute the policy logic, update the state, and possibly
disallow the call to the SRE. Figure 5.5 gives a schematic overview of this process.
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Figure 5.5: Execution monitoring
In our implementation, only the Execution Monitor is inlined. The Policy Decision
Point is kept as a separate component that is called by the Execution Monitor.
The inliner opens the executable file, and scans through it looking for security-
related calls into the base class library. These calls correspond in our system with
CONSPEC SREs. When such a call is found, the inliner inserts new instructions
around this call. These instructions call into the policy decision point, which
keeps track of the policy state. When, during runtime, the policy decision point
notices that an application is going to break the policy, it intervenes and aborts
the security-related call.
Identifying security-relevant methods statically in the presence of dynamic binding
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and delegates (a form of type safe function pointers supported by the .NET virtual
machine) is non-trivial. The tool implements the algorithm by Vanoverberghe and
Piessens [116].
Listings 5.2 and 5.3 show the effect of inlining on a simple program that sends an
SMS. If the method to send SMS’s is considered security relevant, the inliner will
transform it as shown. Note that the tool operates at the level of bytecode, not
on source level, but we show the results as how they would look at source level to
make the transformation easier to understand.
Listing 5.2: Example code that sends an SMS message on a mobile phone.
SmsMessage message = . . .
message . SendSMS ( ) ;
Listing 5.3: The SMS example code, after inlining.
SmsMessage message = . . .
PDP. BeforeSendSMS (message ) ;
try {
message . SendSMS ( ) ;
PDP. AfterSendSMS (message ) ;
} catch ( Secur i tyExcept ion se ) {
throw se ;
} catch ( Exception e ) {
PDP. ExceptionSendSMS (message , e ) ;
throw ;
}
Before each SRE call, a ‘before handler’ is added, which checks whether the
application is allowed to call that method. If not, an exception is thrown. This
exception will prevent the application from calling the method, since the program
will jump over the SRE to the first suitable exception handler it finds.
Likewise, after the SRE call, an ‘after handler’ is added. This handler typically
only updates the internal state of the PDP. If an exception occurs during the
execution of the SRE, the ‘exceptional handler’ will be called instead of the ‘after
handler’. In summary, the different handler methods implement the reaction of
the security automaton to the three types of events: calls, normal returns and
exceptional returns of security-relevant methods.
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Inheritance and Polymorphism
The simplified code shown above does not deal with inheritance and dynamic
binding. Support for this was implemented by extending the logic in the PDP to
consider the type of the object at runtime, instead of only looking at the static
type that is available during the inlining process. When a security-relevant virtual
method is called, calls are inlined to so-called dynamic dispatcher methods that
inspect the runtime type of the object and forward to the correct handler. The
details, and a formal proof of correctness of this inlining algorithm is presented
in [116].
Multithreading and Synchronization
Inlining in a multithreaded program requires synchronization. Two synchronization
strategies are possible: strong synchronization, where the security state is locked
for the entire duration of a SRE call, or weak synchronization where the security
state is locked only during execution of the handler methods.
Our tool implements strong synchronization, which might be problematic when
SREs take a long time to execute, or are blocking (e.g. a method that waits for
an incoming network connection). To alleviate this problem, the tool partitions
the handler methods according to which security state variables they access. Two
partitions that access a distinct set of state variables can be locked independently
from each other.
5.3 Evaluation
The implementation of the S3MS.NET framework, as well as supporting
documentation and examples can be found at:
http://people.cs.kuleuven.be/˜pieter.philippaerts/inliner/
In the context of the S3MS project, we gained experience with the implementation
described in this chapter on two case studies:
• a “Chess-by-SMS” application, where two players can play a game of chess
on their mobile phones over SMS.
• a multiplayer online role-playing game where many players can interact in a
virtual world through their mobile phones. The client for this application
is a graphical interface to this virtual world, and the server implements the
virtual world, and synchronizes the different players.
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In addition, the implementation was used to support a project assignment for a
course on secure software development at the K.U.Leuven. In this assignment,
students were asked to enforce various policies on a .NET e-mail client.
Based on these experiences, we summarize the major advantages and limitations of
the framework.
A major advantage of the framework, compared to state-of-the-art code access
security systems based on sandboxing (such as .NET CAS and the Java Security
Architecture) is its improved expressiveness. The main difference between CAS
and the approach outlined here, is that CAS is stateless. This means that in a
CAS policy, a method call is either allowed for an application or disallowed. With
the S3MS approach, a more dynamic policy can be written, where a method can
for instance be invoked only a particular number of times. This is essential for
enforcing policies that specify quota on resource accesses.
A second important strength of the implementation is its performance. A key
difference between CAS and our approach, is that CAS performs a stack walk
whenever it tries to determine whether the application may invoke a specific
sensitive function or not. Because stack walks are slow, this may be an issue
on mobile devices (CAS is not implemented on the .NET Compact Framework).
The speed of the S3MS approach mainly depends on the speed of the before and
after handlers. These can be made arbitrarily complex, but typically require
only a few simple calculations. This results in a small performance overhead.
Microbenchmarks [117] show that the performance impact of the inlining itself
is negligible, and for the policies and case studies done in S3MS, there was no
noticeable impact on performance.
Finally, the support for multiple policy languages and multiple platforms makes
the framework a very versatile security enforcement tool.
A limitation is that we do not support applications that use reflection. Using the
reflection API, functions can be called dynamically at runtime. Hence, for security
reasons, access to the reflection API should be forbidden, or the entire system
becomes vulnerable. We do not see this as a major disadvantage, however, because
our approach is aimed at mobile devices, and the reflection API is not implemented
on the .NET Compact Framework. Also, by providing suitable policies for invoking
the Reflection API, limited support for reflection could be provided.
A second limitation of the implemented approach is that it is hard and sometimes
even impossible to express certain useful policies as security automata over API
method calls. For instance, a policy that limits the number of bytes transmitted
over a network needs to monitor all API method calls that could lead to network
traffic, and should be able to predict how much bytes of traffic the method will
consume. In the presence of DNS lookups, redirects and so forth, this can be very
hard.
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A final limitation is that the policy languages supported by the framework are
targeted to “expert” users. Writing a correct policy is much like a programming
task. However, more user-friendly (e.g. graphical) policy languages could be
compiled to CONSPEC or 2D-LTL.
5.4 Related Work
The first widely deployed security architecture is based on trust-based signatures
on applications. Applications that are deployed onto the mobile phone can be
signed by a trusted third party, often called Symbian signing [64]. Depending on
whether the system trusts the principal that signed the application, a decision is
made to allow the application or not. The Windows CE security architecture [71]
goes a step further and assigns different permission sets to applications, depending
on their signature. If the signature is valid and trusted, the application is run in a
fully trusted context. Otherwise, the application is either run in a partially trusted
context, or not at all. The BlackBerry supports a security architecture that is
very similar to the one present in Windows CE. Depending on the application’s
signature, it can get access to different sets of API functions. The Java Mobile
Information Device Profile [113] takes a similar approach.
Android probably has the most advanced security model for mobile devices that
is in widespread use today [5]. All applications run on top of the Dalvik virtual
machine, and can be granted a set of permissions. These permissions are granted
at install time, and cannot be changed later on. Different permissions give access
to different parts of the Android API. Android uses application signatures to link
different applications to a single developer, but does not use them to decide on
the trustworthiness of an application. This architecture has been further enhanced
in [37]. Ongtang et al. [80] added runtime policy enforcement for all IPC calls
between Android applications. Every IPC call is intercepted and matched to a set
of policies. If the policies expressly forbid the interaction, the IPC call is canceled.
5.5 Summary
We have argued that the classic security architecture of Windows CE is not well
adapted to protect users from malicious roaming applications. In particular, the
digital signatures used in Windows CE do not offer any guarantee of what the code
will actually do. Section 5.1 introduced the notion of Security-by-Contract (SxC)
and shows that this is superior to the Windows CE security architecture.
The SxC architecture can be used to secure untrusted roaming code, and protect
users from malicious applications. By defining security contracts for applications
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during their development, and by matching these contracts with device policies
during deployment, compliance with the policy can be verified without incurring a
runtime overhead. Legacy applications, or applications with contracts that cannot
be verified, can be executed under the supervision of an execution monitor that
will prevent the monitored application from violating the policy.
We have implemented the SxC paradigm on top of the Microsoft .NET Compact
Framework for Windows Mobile devices. Our evaluation shows that using our
framework imposes no or a very small runtime overhead, while actively protecting
the system from abusive applications.

Chapter 6
Conclusion
We summarize this dissertation by revisiting the goals set forth in Section 1.3. The
contributions are highlighted and linked to the different goals. We will then look
at the ongoing work, related to the contributions of this dissertation. Finally, we
conclude with a look at the future challenges in the field of mobile phone security.
6.1 Contributions
In Section 1.3, we set forth a number of goals for this dissertation. This section
explains how these goals are met by the contributions.
We wanted to show that security is an important topic for mobile phones. An
attacker that takes control over a mobile phone has unlimited access to all the
resources of the phone. This is a serious threat, and users often underestimate
the danger of this. We have proven that attackers can still mount a full and
unrestricted attack on mobile phones, even in the presence of severe limitations on
shellcode. The contributions in Chapter 3 show that if the attacker is limited to a
small subset of all ARM instructions, consisting of all the instructions whose bytes
are alphanumeric, he can still execute arbitrary code. This subset has been proven
to be Turing Complete by implementing an interpreter for the BrainF*ck language,
which is itself Turing Complete.
We wanted to build tools that can be used by phone manufacturers to secure
their applications. The key here was to make sure that it is more difficult for an
attacker to exploit a bug in the application. In other words, we wanted to make
sure that bugs do not become vulnerabilities. Chapter 4 presented our solution to
this problem. It introduced a new countermeasure against code injection attacks
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called Code Pointer Masking (CPM). This countermeasure is implemented as an
extension of the GCC compiler. During the compilation process, the compiler emits
additional code that checks at runtime whether code pointers point to the contents
they are supposed to point to. If an attacker succeeds in modifying a code pointer,
the CPM countermeasure will mask the modified code pointer, which makes sure
that the attacker will not be able to jump to injected shellcode.
We wanted to minimize the potential risk of bugs in applications, and we also
wanted the phone to be secure in the presence of malicious applications. These
applications are installed and executed by the user, and thus are much harder
to detect than other malware. Our solution is presented in Chapter 5, where
we report on our implementation of the Security-by-Contract (SxC) paradigm.
In this paradigm, additional checks ensure that an application will not violate
a predetermined system policy. This policy will set restrictions on the usage of
certain critical or costly resources of the mobile phone, effectively limiting the
amount of damage that a malicious application can do. Our work focused on
the implementation of the different tools and architecture, and on the inliner
component. The inliner rewrites applications during deployment time, and embeds
runtime checks that monitor the usage of different resources, and optionally blocks
access to them.
Our tools and frameworks are highly performant and very compatible with existing
code. The CPM countermeasure has a performance overhead of only a few
percentage points, and a memory overhead of practically 0%. It is also very
compatible with existing code bases, as was shown by the SPEC benchmark. Only
one manual intervention had to be made for the entire 500,000+ lines-of-code
benchmark to compile.
The SxC implementation shares the same characteristics. If an application that is
being deployed can somehow prove that it will never break the system policy, the
SxC framework will not impose any overhead at all. However, for other applications,
a runtime monitor is embedded in the application. The performance of this monitor
depends almost entirely on the complexity of the policy that is being enforced. Our
SxC implementation is very compatible with existing code; not a single application
has been reported to not work with the prototype.
In summary, it can be said that the various goals of this dissertation are met, as we
have presented and implemented a number of different technological improvements
upon the state of the art. However, not until these and other improvements have
gone mainstream can we say that the state of mobile phone security is improving.
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6.2 Ongoing Work
The work presented in this PhD thesis is still ongoing. Some related topics that
could be worked out in future work are discussed in this section.
Alphanumeric Turing Complete Shellcode In Chapter 3 we have proven that
alphanumeric shellcode is Turing Complete on ARM. We did this by implementing
an interpreter for the BrainF*ck language. Although this is sufficient to prove
Turing Completeness, it is difficult to actually use this interpreter in a real attack.
One interesting extension would be to write an instruction decoder in alphanumeric
shellcode. The idea works as follows: the attacker writes some malicious code
that he wants to execute. After compiling this code, it will most likely not be
alphanumeric, and hence cannot be used as-is under the assumption that non-
alphanumeric data is likely to get mingled. The attacker could, however, encode
this program using an algorithm like the Base32 algorithm, which essentially
converts this non-alphanumeric array of bytes to a (longer) alphanumeric array of
bytes. If we have an alphanumeric decoder that decodes this encoded string and
starts executing it, then we would have an interesting tool to deploy any malicious
shellcode without adding a lot of complexity to the attacker.
Mason et al. [65] have shown that it is possible to generate shellcode for the x86
architecture that resembles written English text. This makes it even harder for
intrusion detection systems to try and intercept shellcode by analyzing input data.
It would be interesting to try a similar strategy for the ARM processor. This would
probably be much more difficult than on the x86 architecture, but it would be
interesting to see how far one could get with this.
Code Pointer Masking The CPM countermeasure is still in active development.
A number of improvements are either being worked out, or are on the drawing
board to be implemented at a later stage.
We already have a partial implementation of CPM on the Intel x86 architecture
that protects the return address. This can be extended to offer full protection for
all the remaining code pointers. Some architecture specific challenges will have to
be overcome, but no major blocking issues are expected here.
CPM also does not protect dynamically loaded libraries. A system could be
implemented where the binary code of libraries contains placeholder instructions
at certain key locations, and where these placeholders are overwritten by masking
instructions when the library is loaded into memory. This requires changes to the
compiler, which must emit the required placeholder instructions, and also to the
loader framework, which must rewrite the loaded libraries. In addition, it might
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also be necessary that libraries and programs ship with some kind of metadata
that contains information to calculate the different masks at runtime.
On the ARM architecture, there are also interesting hardware features that could
be used in order to further increase the security guarantees of the countermeasure.
In particular, the support for conditional execution on the ARM architecture can
be used to further narrow down the different return sites an attacker can return
to. New hardware features that are specifically aimed at improving application
security could also be designed and implemented of course.
Finally, the algorithm that is currently used to shuffle around the different methods
at compilation time in order to optimize masks is relatively straightforward.
Different schemes could be implemented to see if the masks could be narrowed
down even further.
Security-by-Contract A major source of ongoing work for the Security-by-
Contract paradigm, is the development of tools that make writing policies and
contracts easy. At this moment, writing policies and contracts is very difficult.
Only technical people with an intimate knowledge of the framework for which the
policies are being developed can write them. But even for a skilled policy writer, it
can become very cumbersome to write or update large policies. Also, the larger the
policy gets, the more likely it is that some holes are left uncovered. Some work has
already been done to make this process easier [89, 104], but more work is required.
One of the main drawbacks of the current S3MS.NET implementation, is the fact
that adding support for reflection to a policy is difficult. The main reason for
this, is that we implemented the prototype to use client-side inlining instead of
library-side runtime checking. This design choice was motivated by the fact that
we do not have access to the source code of the .NET (Compact) Framework,
which would be a prerequisite in order to build a library-side runtime monitor. It
also has the additional benefit that there is no additional overhead when runtime
monitoring is not required to guarantee the safety of an application. It would be
interesting to build another prototype on one of the open source .NET frameworks
(i.e. the Mono Framework [78] or the Rotor Framework [70]) that implements
library-side runtime monitoring. The expected overhead is likely to be very small,
and this would automatically enable support for reflection.
6.3 Future Challenges
Software firms are spending more time educating developers to write better and more
secure code, because they realize that it is a huge competitive disadvantage to have
buggy and exploitable applications. Large software companies have development
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processes in place where security is one of the cornerstones of the design of any
software system, and specialized security teams periodically review code for any
potential software vulnerabilities. As this newer, more secure code reaches the
market, and as more countermeasures are being deployed, attackers will find it
increasingly difficult to attack a device through software vulnerabilities.
Software implementations have always been the weakest link in the security chain,
but as the software design processes evolve, this is gradually becoming less the case.
Attackers will have to find other means of circumventing the security measures that
are in place. One way to do that, is to deceive the users of devices into willingly
installing malicious software. Users are often not capable of making decisions that
pertain to security, and as such it is up to the security research community to find
ways that will keep users safe.
Frameworks such as the Security-by-Contract framework will become more
important in the future. SxC does not rely on user input, and ensures that
any application that is being deployed on the device will not violate a fixed system
policy. Malicious applications might still be able to exploit some of the system
resources, but only up to a measurable and predetermined point.
Future research will focus on ‘empowering the user’. It will help the user to
understand the security consequences of installing an application, and will guide
him in making the right decisions. An attacker should not have any control over
this process, as this might allow him to influence the user in some way.
Chip manufacturers are also improving support for hardware-based virtualization
or application isolation. One particular example is the TrustZone API [8] for the
ARM architecture. This API offers the primitives to build a secure subsystem that
manages sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. Future research will leverage
these new hardware components, and build trusted subsystems that further decrease
the likelihood that sensitive data is stolen from the device, even in the event of a
software compromise.

Appendix A
Alphanumeric ARM
Instructions
The table below lists all the instructions present in ARMv6. For each instruction,
we have checked some simple constraints that may not be broken in order for the
instruction to be alphanumeric. The main focus of this table is the high order bits
of the second byte of the instruction (bits 23 to 20). Only the high order bits of
this byte are included, because the high order bits of the first byte are set by the
condition flags, and the high order bits of the third and fourth byte are often set
by the operands of the instruction. When the table contains the value ‘d’ for a bit,
it means that the value of this bit depends on specific settings.
The final column contains a list of things that disqualify the instruction for being
used in alphanumeric shellcode. Disqualification criteria are that at least one of
the four bytes of the instruction is either always too high to be alphanumeric, or
too low. In this column, the following conventions are used:
• ‘IO’ is used to indicate that one or more bits is always 1
• ‘IZ’ is used to indicate that one or more bits is always 0
• ‘SO’ is used to indicate that one or more bits should be 1
• ‘SZ’ is used to indicate that one or more bits should be 0
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Table A.1: The ARMv6 instruction set
Instruction Version 23 22 21 20 Disqualifiers
ADC 1 0 1 d IO: 23
ADD 1 0 0 d IO: 23
AND 0 0 0 d IZ: 23-21
B, BL d d d d
BIC 1 1 0 d IO: 23
BKPT 5+ 0 0 1 0 IO: 31, IZ: 22, 20
BLX (1) 5+ d d d d IO: 31
BLX (2) 5+ 0 0 1 0 SO: 15, IZ: 22, 20
BX 4T, 5+ 0 0 1 0 IO: 7, SO: 15, IZ 22, 20
BXJ 5TEJ, 6+ 0 0 1 0 SO: 15, IZ: 22, 20, 6, 4
CDP d d d d
CLZ 5+ 0 1 1 0 IZ: 7-5
CMN 0 1 1 1 SZ: 15-13
CMP 0 1 0 1 SZ: 15-13
CPS 6+ 0 0 0 0 SZ: 15-13, IZ 22-20
CPY 6+ 1 0 1 0 IZ: 22, 20, 7-5, IO 23
EOR 0 0 1 d
LDC d d d 1
LDM (1) d 0 d 1
LDM (2) d 1 0 1
LDM (3) d 1 d 1 IO: 15
LDR d 0 d 1
LDRB d 1 d 1
LDRBT 0 1 1 1
LDRD 5TE+ d d d 0
LDREX 6+ 1 0 0 1 IO: 23, 7
LDRH d d d 1 IO: 7
LDRSB 4+ d d d 1 IO: 7
LDRSH 4+ d d d 1 IO: 7
LDRT d 0 1 1
MCR d d d 0
MCRR 5TE+ 0 1 0 0
MLA 0 0 1 d IO: 7
MOV 1 0 1 d IO: 23
MRC d d d 1
MRRC 5TE+ 0 1 0 1
MRS 0 d 0 0 SZ: 7-0
MSR 0 d 1 0 SO: 15
MUL 0 0 0 d IO: 7
MVN 1 1 1 d IO: 23
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
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ORR 1 0 0 d IO: 23
PKHBT 6+ 1 0 0 0 IO: 23
PKHTB 6+ 1 0 0 0 IO: 23
PLD 5TE+,
!5TExP
d 1 0 1 IO: 15
QADD 5TE+ 0 0 0 0 IZ: 22-21
QADD16 6+ 0 0 1 0 IZ: 22, 20
QADD8 6+ 0 0 1 0 IZ: 22, 20, IO: 7
QADDSUBX 6+ 0 0 1 0 IZ: 22, 20
QDADD 5TE+ 0 1 0 0
QDSUB 5TE+ 0 1 1 0
QSUB 5TE+ 0 0 1 0 IZ: 22, 20
QSUB16 6+ 0 0 1 0 IZ: 22, 20
QSUB8 6+ 0 0 1 0 IZ: 22, 20, IO: 7
QSUBADDX 6+ 0 0 1 0 IZ: 22, 20
REV 6+ 1 0 1 1 IO: 23
REV16 6+ 1 0 1 1 IO: 23, 7
REVSH 6+ 1 1 1 1 IO: 23, 7
RFE 6+ d 0 d 1 SZ: 14-13, 6-5
RSB 0 1 1 d
RSC 1 1 1 d IO: 23
SADD16 6+ 0 0 0 1 IZ: 22-21
SADD8 6+ 0 0 0 1 IZ: 22-21, IO: 7
SADDSUBX 6+ 0 0 0 1 IZ: 22-21
SBC 1 1 0 d IO: 23
SEL 6+ 1 0 0 0 IO: 23
SETEND 6+ 0 0 0 0 SZ: 14-13, IZ: 22-21, 6-5
SHADD16 6+ 0 0 1 1 IZ: 6-5
SHADD8 6+ 0 0 1 1 IO: 7
SHADDSUBX 6+ 0 0 1 1
SHSUB16 6+ 0 0 1 1
SHSUB8 6+ 0 0 1 1 IO: 7
SHSUBADDX 6+ 0 0 1 1
SMLA 5TE+ 0 0 0 0 IO: 7, IZ: 22-21
SMLAD 6+ 0 0 0 0 IZ: 22-21
SMLAL 1 1 1 d IO: 23,7
SMLAL 5TE+ 0 1 0 0 IO: 7
SMLALD 6+ 0 1 0 0
SMLAW 5TE+ 0 0 1 0 IZ: 22, 20, IO: 7
SMLSD 6+ 0 0 0 0 IZ: 22-21
Continued on next page
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SMLSLD 6+ 0 1 0 0
SMMLA 6+ 0 1 0 1
SMMLS 6+ 0 1 0 1 IO: 7
SMMUL 6+ 0 1 0 1 IO: 15
SMUAD 6+ 0 0 0 0 IZ: 22-21, IO: 15
SMUL 5TE+ 0 1 1 0 SZ: 15, IO: 7
SMULL 1 1 0 d IO: 23
SMULW 5TE+ 0 0 1 0 IZ: 22, 20,SZ: 14-13, IO: 7
SMUSD 6+ 0 0 0 0 IZ: 22-21, IO: 15
SRS 6+ d 1 d 0 SZ: 14-13, 6-5
SSAT 6+ 1 0 1 d IO: 23
SSAT16 6+ 1 0 1 0 IO: 23
SSUB16 6+ 0 0 0 1 IZ: 22-21
SSUB8 6+ 0 0 0 1 IZ: 22-21, IO: 7
SSUBADDX 6+ 0 0 0 1 IZ: 22-21
STC 2+ d d d 0
STM (1) d 0 d 0 IZ: 22, 20
STM (2) d 1 0 0
STR d 0 d 0 IZ: 22, 20
STRB d 1 d 0
STRBT d 1 1 0
STRD 5TE+ d d d 0 IO: 7
STREX 6+ 1 0 0 0 IO: 7
STRH 4+ d d d 0 IO: 7
STRT d 0 1 0 IZ: 22, 20
SUB 0 1 0 d
SWI d d d d
SWP 2a, 3+ 0 0 0 0 IZ: 22-21, IO: 7
SWPB 2a, 3+ 0 1 0 0 IO: 7
SXTAB 6+ 1 0 1 0 IO: 23
SXTAB16 6+ 1 0 0 0 IO: 23
SXTAH 6+ 1 0 1 1 IO: 23
SXTB 6+ 1 0 1 0 IO: 23
SXTB16 6+ 1 0 0 0 IO: 23
SXTH 6+ 1 0 1 1 IO: 23
TEQ 0 0 1 1 SZ: 14-13
TST 0 0 0 1 IZ: 22-21, SZ: 14-13
UADD16 6+ 0 1 0 1 IZ: 6-5
UADD8 6+ 0 1 0 1 IO: 7
UADDSUBX 6+ 0 1 0 1
Continued on next page
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UHADD16 6+ 0 1 1 1 IZ: 6-5
UHADD8 6+ 0 1 1 1 IO: 7
UHADDSUBX 6+ 0 1 1 1
UHSUB16 6+ 0 1 1 1
UHSUB8 6+ 0 1 1 1 IO: 7
UHSUBADDX 6+ 0 1 1 1
UMAAL 6+ 0 1 0 0 IO: 7
UMLAL 1 0 1 d IO: 23, 7
UMULL 1 0 0 d IO: 23, 7
UQADD16 6+ 0 1 1 0 IZ: 6-5
UQADD8 6+ 0 1 1 0 IO: 7
UQADDSUBX 6+ 0 1 1 0
UQSUB16 6+ 0 1 1 0
UQSUB8 6+ 0 1 1 0 IO: 7
UQSUBADDX 6+ 0 1 1 0
USAD8 6+ 1 0 0 0 IO: 23, 15, IZ: 6-5
USADA8 6+ 1 0 0 0 IO: 23, IZ: 6-5
USAT 6+ 1 1 1 d IO: 23
USAT16 6+ 1 1 1 0 IO: 23
USUB16 6+ 0 1 0 1
USUB8 6+ 0 1 0 1 IO: 7
USUBADDX 6+ 0 1 0 1
UXTAB 6+ 1 1 1 0 IO: 23
UXTAB16 6+ 1 1 0 0 IO: 23
UXTAH 6+ 1 1 1 1 IO: 23
UXTB 6+ 1 1 1 0 IO: 23
UXTB16 6+ 1 1 0 0 IO: 23
UXTH 6+ 1 1 1 1 IO: 23
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